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Warrant Clauset
I. Introduction
On April 6, 1983, a contingent of federal agents' broke into
a warehouse in South Boston, Massachusetts and discovered 270
bales of marijuana.2 No warrant authorized this search and no
exigent circumstances justified this entry.' Immediately follow-
ing the five-minute search of the warehouse, the same agents re-
quested a search warrant.4 The agent who prepared the applica-
tion for the search warrant testified that he intentionally
excluded from the affidavit any mention of the previous entry
t The author wishes to thank Professors Barbara C. Salken and Bennett C.
Gershman for their encouragement and assistance in their review of earlier drafts of this
Note. In addition, the author is deeply appreciative of the support of Maureen V.
McDonnell. The author would like to dedicate this Note to my late mentor and friend,
James B. Grant, Esq.
1. Ten agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) entered the warehouse after Ronald Garibotto, supervising DEA
agent, forced open the warehouse door using a tire iron he obtained from his car. Joint
Appendix to Brief for Petitioners and Respondent at 80, Murray v. United States, 108 S.
Ct. 2529 (1988), (Nos. 86-995 & 86-1016) [hereinafter Joint Appendix] (excerpts from
pretrial transcript - cross-examination of Ronald Garibotto).
2. Id. at 25 (search warrant return).
3. United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 602 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted and
remanded sub nom. Murray v. United States, 476 U.S. 1138, aff'd on remand sub nom.
United States v. Carter, 803 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
4. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 69. The probable cause for the warrant was
based on the pre-entry knowledge which was found to be substantial. This case did not
question the strong basis for the belief prior to the illegal entry that a large quantity of
illegal drugs was present in the warehouse.
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into the warehouse.5 Approximately eight hours after the initial
entry at 2:45 p.m., a warrant was issued.6 The same contingent
of agents then reentered the warehouse and seized the mari-
juana.7 As a result of this seizure of evidence, Michael Murray
and James Carter, owners of the corporation which owned the
warehouse where the marijuana was seized, were convicted of
conspiracy to possess and distribute illegal drugs.8 This convic-
tion has been appealed and the United States Supreme Court
has twice granted certiorari.9 Although there has been no final
disposition to date,' 0 the Court indicated that it would have af-
firmed the conviction, even though the search was in violation of
the fourth amendment, provided "the agents would have sought
a [search] warrant if they had not earlier entered the
warehouse.""
This case provided the Court with the opportunity to an-
swer the question that had not been addressed in Segura v.
United States: whether the fourth amendment requires the
suppression of evidence initially discovered in plain view during
5. Id. at 70 (excerpts from pretrial transcript - cross examination of Alan Keaney,
DEA case agent in charge of the investigation: "Q. I just asked you, did you decide inten-
tionally not to include in the affidavit that you and other agents had already been inside
the warehouse? . . . A. [by agent Keaney] Yes, your Honor.").
6. Id. at 12 (search warrant issued by United States Magistrate Joyce London Alex-
ander on Apr. 6, 1983 at 10:35 p.m.).
7. Id. at 36 (DEA report of investigation, dated May 11, 1983).
8. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2532 (1988).
9. Murray v. United States, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); 476 U.S. 1138 (1986).
10. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2536. Judgment vacated and case remanded to Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit with instructions to remand to district court for determina-
tion of "whether the warrant-authorized search of the warehouse was an independent
source of the challenged evidence .... Id.
11. Id.
12. 468 U.S. 796 (1984). See infra notes 238-64 and accompanying text. Chief Jus-
tice Burger noted that:
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the initial entry into
the apartment was not justified by exigent circumstances, and thus that the items
discovered in plain view during the limited security check had to be suppressed to
effect the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The United States, although it
does not concede the correctness of this holding, does not contest it in this Court.
Because the Government has decided not to press its argument that exigent cir-
cumstances existed, we need not and do not address this aspect of the Court of
Appeals decision. We are concerned only with whether the Court of Appeals prop-
erly determined that the Fourth Amendment did not require suppression of the
evidence seized during execution of the valid warrant.
Id. at 802 n.4.
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an illegal warrantless search when that same evidence is later
seized pursuant to a search warrant requested by the same of-
ficers. 13 Justice Scalia, in his plurality opinion,1" held that the
fourth amendment does not require that this evidence be sup-
pressed provided that the rediscovery of the evidence was pursu-
ant to a valid search warrant wholly independent of the illegal
search. 5 Justice Scalia based his holding in Murray on an analy-
sis of the independent source doctrine" and its application to
the Murray case. 17 Unfortunately, instead of providing guidance
in the area of the independent source exception to the exclusion-
ary rule,18 the Murray case raises several questions. Specifically,
Justice Scalia uses the concepts of the independent source doc-
trine, 9 attenuated connection,20 and the inevitable discovery
doctrine21 without clearly distinguishing each doctrine from the
13. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
14. Murray was a four-to-three decision with Justices Brennan and Kennedy not
participating. Id. at 2531.
15. Id. at 2535.
16. Id. at 2533-35. See infra note 19.
17. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2535-36.
18. The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution. See infra notes 129-52 and accompanying
text.
19. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Court
held that government could not use knowledge of a document obtained as a result of an
illegal search and seizure to subpoena the same document).
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that
it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus ob-
tained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained
by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.
Id.
20. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (Court held that the
defendant was entitled to examine the prosecution as to whether illegally obtained evi-
dence was used in obtaining the conviction). The attenuated connection doctrine pro-
posed by the Court is a revision of the independent source doctrine in that it allows use
of evidence which may have been obtained as a result of a constitutional violation pro-
vided the causal relationship between the violation and the evidence is "so attenuated as
to dissipate the taint." Id.
21. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). The Court held that the body of
the victim, discovered as a result of a violation of the defendant's sixth amendment
rights, was admissible at trial since the body would have inevitably been discovered had
no constitutional violation occurred. A search party of over 200 individuals was looking
for the body in the same vicinity. Id. at 435-44. Under the inevitable discovery doctrine,
the evidence is actually obtained as a result of unlawful police activity, but it is found to
3
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other."2 These doctrines are fact sensitive and have a different
application and test to determine the appropriateness of their
use. This absence of clarity will provide little guidance on re-
mand to the district court in its assessment of whether "the war-
rant-authorized search of the warehouse was an independent
source of the challenged evidence in the sense we [the Court]
have described. '23
This absence of guidance is further emphasized by the
Court's remand to the district court for a determination of
whether "the agents would have sought a warrant if they had
not earlier entered the warehouse." 2' This focus on the intention
of the agents in determining whether the search warrant was an
independent source of the evidence is not consistent with past
independent source doctrine cases.25 The problem with relying
on the intent of the agents is articulated in Justice Marshall's
dissent: "I believe the Court's decision, by failing to provide suf-
ficient guarantees that the subsequent search was, in fact, inde-
pendent of the illegal search, emasculates the Warrant Clause
and undermines the deterrence function of the exclusionary
rule." 26
Part II of this Note reviews the historical background of
fourth amendment rights with particular attention to the role of
the magistrate in issuing a search warrant, the traditional con-
cept of the warrant preference requirement, and the exclusion-
ary rule in insuring respect for these rights. In addition, Part II
reviews the independent source doctrine and its corollary doc-
trines, inevitable discovery, and attenuated connection. Particu-
lar attention is also directed to a review of Segura v. United
be admissible if the police can demonstrate that they inevitably would have obtained it
through legal means. Id. at 444. See infra notes 216-37 and accompanying text.
22. For example, Justice Scalia, though he found the independent source doctrine
applicable to Murray, focused on whether the adoption of this exception would provide
an incentive for police misconduct. This factor is only applicable to the inevitable discov-
ery exception. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2533-36. See infra notes 384-89, 435-37 and accom-
panying text.
23. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2536.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443, infra notes 216-37 and accompanying text; Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text; Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), infra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
26. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2536 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 10:167
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States27 and United States v. Silvestri.2" The facts of Murray,
its procedural history, and the Supreme Court decision are dis-
cussed in Part III.
Part IV presents an analysis of the tests for application of
independent source, attenuated connection, and inevitable dis-
covery doctrines. This analysis reveals that these doctrines,
though functionally related, are separate and distinct. Each doc-
trine is highly fact sensitive and the application of each to the
same facts will result in a different conclusion in terms of
whether the evidence in question is admitted. Although each
doctrine should be applied separately, this Note asserts that the
correct review of whether any evidence is the "fruit of the poi-
sonous tree"2 9 is through application of each doctrine in the fol-
lowing sequence: classical independent source, attenuated con-
nection, and inevitable discovery.
Part V concludes that the correct analysis of the issue
presented in Murray is through a systematic and separate appli-
cation of each doctrine. This analysis will demonstrate that the
evidence should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule be-
cause application of independent source, attenuated connection,
and inevitable discovery doctrines will not support admission of
the evidence.
II. Background
A. General Concerns of the Fourth Amendment
1. Historical Perspective
The historical context which gave rise to the fourth amend-
ment30 was the Framers' experience with the writs of assistance
and their enforcement in pre-Revolutionary War days."1 In
27. 468 U.S. 796 (1984). See infra notes 238-64 and accompanying text.
28. 787 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1986). See infra notes 265-93 and accompanying text.
29. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), see infra note 205.
30. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
31. See N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
1990]
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America, the writs of assistance were primarily applied to com-
bat smuggling by colonists who refused to fully comply with the
various import taxes and restrictions.32 In addition, these colo-
nists were familiar with issues of search and seizure in English
law.33 The use of the Star Chamber,34 the seditious libel and
censorship laws, 5 and the powers granted to trade organizations
and guilds to enforce these laws3 6 caused special concern. These
trade organizations, particularly in the publications area, were
given broad search and seizure power.3 7 This included the ability
to enter private property to search for and seize items that were
in violation of specific laws.3 ' No prior warrant specifically
describing the areas to be searched and the items to be seized
was required." The Framers found this power unacceptable in a
democratic government, and to prevent this abuse of power they
enacted the fourth amendment.40
During the first century of the Supreme Court's existence,
the Court was rarely confronted with fourth amendment is-
sues.4 1 This was a result of two facts: First, the Court had found
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78 (1937). The Molasses Act of 1733 and the Sugar
Act of 1764 (restricting trade), and the Stamp Act of 1765 (requiring tax stamps for all
legal documents), are several of the laws which were in extreme disfavor in America and
which were enforced through the wide search and seizure powers of the writs of assis-
tance. Id.
32. Id.
33. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 13-50 (1966).
Landynski noted that "[tihe antecedent history of the Fourth Amendment, therefore,
has two principal sources: the English and American experiences of virtually unre-
strained and judicially unsupervised searches .... From these tributaries flowed the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 20.
34. In 1566 the Court of the Star Chamber empowered the warden of the Stationers'
Company with the authority to search any warehouse, shop, or other place and to seize
books violating the laws on the licensing of books and the regulating of the printing
industry. N. LASSON, supra note 31, at 24-25.
35. Id. at 26.
36. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 21. As early as the reign of Henry VI (1422-1461)
the Company of Dyers of London was granted the authority to search for and seize cloth
dyed with logwood. N. LASSON, supra note 31, at 23-24.
37. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 21.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See N. LASSON, supra note 31, at 51-78 and J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 19-
48 for extensive background information on the origin of the fourth amendment.
41. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 49 n.3 cited the following as the only Supreme
Court cases presenting fourth amendment issues prior to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886); In re Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878); Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 59 U.S. (18
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/5
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that the amendments to the Constitution were not binding on
the states;42 second, the right of appeal in criminal actions to the
Supreme Court did not exist until 1891.11 In 1886, Justice Brad-
ley in Boyd v. United States" presented the first Supreme
Court analysis of the history and protection provided by the
fourth amendment.4 5 This decision, which provided the frame-
work and standard of review for analysis of fourth amendment
issues,46 has been regarded as a benchmark in constitutional in-
terpretation of the fourth amendment.47 Boyd involved a cus-
toms forfeiture case in which the United States government
claimed fraud in connection with the importing of thirty-five
cases of plate glass and sought to confiscate the plate glass. 48
This case did not actually involve a search but rather presented
a demand by the government in a civil proceeding for the forced
production of invoices for the plate glass.'9 Justice Bradley, hav-
ing defined this forced production as a search, 50 embarked on an
analysis of the fourth amendment through a review of the his-
torical developments of the amendment and asserted:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, where that right has never been for-
feited by his conviction of some public offense .... 51
Justice Bradley provided further guidance regarding the proper
standard of review for fourth amendment questions with the fol-
lowing comments:
How.) 272 (1855); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855); Ex parte Buford, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
42. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (amendments to Constitution
were found not to be a limit on state action).
43. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 49 n.1 (citing ch. 517, 26 Stat. 827 (1891)).
44. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
45. Id. at 624-30.
46. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 49-61 for extensive analysis of Boyd.
47. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 389-90 (1914). See infra notes 129-47 and accompanying text for extensive discus-
sion of Mapp and Weeks.
48. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617-18.
49. Id. at 618.
50. Id. at 622. "[C]ompulsory production of a man's private papers... is within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment .... Id.
51. Id. at 630.
1990]
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It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property should be liberally
construed."2
This decision provided the Court with the framework for analy-
sis of fourth amendment questions which was utilized by the
Court in the early part of the twentieth century."3
2. Relationship Between the First and the Second Clause
of the Fourth Amendment
The first clause of the fourth amendment guarantees the
people to be free from "unreasonable" searches and seizures. 4
The second clause provides the conditions under which a search
warrant can be issued.5 5 A definition of unreasonable and a de-
lineation of the relationship between the two clauses is not pro-
vided by the amendment and has been the focus of critical dif-
ferences in interpretations regarding the protection provided by
the amendment. 6
Jacob Landynski, in Search and Seizure and the Supreme
Court,57 proposed three possible interpretations of the relation-
ship between the two clauses:
(1) that the "reasonable" search is one which meets the warrant
52. Id. at 635.
53. E.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931); Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 308-11 (1921); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389-91
(1914).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55. Id.
56. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (warrantless search of a
small one-room office incident to arrest was reasonable under the fourth amendment).
But see Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (evidence seized by police who had
traced the odor of burning opium to a hotel room and demanded entry was inadmissible
even though the probable cause presented to the police may have been sufficient to have
resulted in the issuance of a search warrant if presented to a magistrate).
57. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33. The Supreme Court has cited to this work with
approval in a number of cases including: Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 n.21
(1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 n.18 (1976); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
768 n.14 (1969); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 n.9 (1967).
[Vol. 10:167
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requirements specified in the second clause; (2) that the first
clause provides an additional restriction by implying that some
searches may be "unreasonable" and therefore not permissible,
even when made under warrant; or (3) that the first clause pro-
vides an additional search power, authorizing the judiciary to find
some searches "reasonable" even when carried out without
warrant.58
Landynski found that either of the first two interpretations is
faithful to the intended meaning of the amendment. 9 He also
found that the third interpretation is not faithful to the amend-
ment as "[iut would be strange, to say the least, for the amend-
ment to specify stringent warrant requirements, after having in
effect negated these by authorizing judicially unsupervised 'rea-
sonable' searches without warrant. To detach the first clause
from the second is to run the risk of making the second virtually
useless." 0 Landynski's first interpretation represents the tradi-
tional understanding"1 of this relationship between the two
clauses. Reflective of this understanding is Justice Powell's com-
ment in United States v. United States District Court Eastern
District of Michigan"2 that "[tihough the Fourth Amendment
speaks broadly of 'unreasonable searches and seizures,' the defi-
nition of 'reasonableness' turns, at least in part, on the more
specific commands of the warrant clause."63
58. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 42-43.
59. Id. at 43.
60. Id. at 44.
61. Id. at 43. Landynski points out:
In [the Supreme Court's] decisions [prior to the late 1940's,] it generally inter-
preted the Fourth Amendment to make the "unreasonable" search synonymous
with the warrantless search. It held, moreover, that the search for a person's pri-
vate papers was unreasonable, and therefore forbidden, even when made pursuant
to a warrant.
Id.
62. 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (fourth amendment requires prior judicial approval for do-
mestic wiretaps).
63. Id. at 315. Justice Powell further noted that "[slome have argued that '[tlhe
relevant test is not whether the search was reasonable.' This view, however, overlooks the
second clause of the Amendment. The warrant clause of the Amendment is not dead
language." Id. (citation omitted).
1990]
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3. The Warrant Requirement
Harris v. United States6 4 and United States v. Rabino-
witz 65 illustrate the interpretation that searches, as long as they
are reasonable, are within the fourth amendment. This interpre-
tation of the relationship between the two clauses is based on an
understanding that the warrant language of the second clause is
a mere statement of the standards for the issuance of a search
warrant, should the police seek one. In both cases the reasona-
bleness of the search was examined in light of the circumstances,
and the lack of a warrant was subordinate to the question of
whether the conduct of the government was reasonable.6 The
present member of the Supreme Court who appears most closely
allied with this position is Justice Scalia, the author of Murray
v. United States. This assessment of Justice Scalia's position on
the relationship between the two clauses of the fourth amend-
ment is evidenced by his decisions for the Court in Arizona v.
Hicks67 and Griffin v. Wisconsin. 8
The more traditional approach to the warrant requirement
is exemplified by the line of cases beginning with Johnson v.
United States in 1948.9 The question asked under the tradi-
64. 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (warrantless search of an entire apartment incident to an
arrest was reasonable under the fourth amendment).
65. 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (warrantless search of a small one-room office incident to
arrest was reasonable under the fourth amendment). Both Harris and Rabinowitz were
overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (warrantless searches inci-
dent to arrest were limited to the grabbable area of the individual arrested).
66. Harris, 331 U.S. at 150. "[It is only unreasonable searches and seizures which
come within the constitutional interdict. The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in
rigid and absolute terms." Id. "[S]uch searches turn upon the reasonableness under all
circumstances and not upon the practicability of procuring a search warrant, for the war-
rant is not required." Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 65-66.
67. 480 U.S. 1149 (1987) (officer who was legally on the premises violated the fourth
amendment by moving stereo equipment to read the serial number). Justice Scalia indi-
cated that the "moving of the equipment . . . did constitute a search" and that if the
police had probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion, their warrantless search of
the turntable would have been legitimate. Id. at 1152. Justice Scalia did not indicate that
what was needed was both probable cause and a search warrant. Thus, probable cause
may have made the search reasonable.
68. 483 U.S. 868 (1987). Warrantless search of probationer's home was found to
have satisfied "the demands of the Fourth Amendment because it was carried out pursu-
ant to a regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment reasonableness require-
ment under well established principles." Id. at 873.
69. 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (evidence seized by police who had traced the odor of burning
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/5
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tional warrant approach is whether the government's failure to
obtain a warrant prior to the search and seizure was reasonable
under the circumstances presented.70 In 1984, the Court, in
Thompson v. Louisiana'7 1 noted this preference for search war-
rants in the following:
In a long line of cases, this Court has stressed that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and
well delineated exceptions." This was not a principle freshly
coined for the occasion in Katz, but rather represented this
Court's longstanding understanding of the relationship between
the two Clauses of the Fourth Amendment. Since the time of
Katz, this Court has recognized the existence of additional excep-
tions. However, we have consistently reaffirmed our understand-
ing that in all cases outside the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment the Fourth Amendment requires the interposition of a
neutral and detached magistrate between the police and the "per-
sons, house, papers, and effects" of citizens."
The cases that follow this line of analysis regard all warrantless
searches as per se unconstitutional unless one of the explicit ex-
ceptions73 to the warrant requirements is fully satisfied.74 These
two approaches 75 to the relationship between the two clauses
opium to a hotel room and demanded entry was inadmissible even though the probable
cause presented to the police may have been sufficient to have resulted in the issuance of
a search warrant if presented to a magistrate).
70. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). The Court held that search
and seizures incident to arrest must be limited by the "cardinal rule that, in seizing
goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants wher-
ever reasonably practicable." Id. at 705.
71. 469 U.S. 17 (1984) (Court rejected the murder scene exception to the warrant
requirement).
72. Id. at 19-20 (citations omitted).
73. See infra notes 100-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of exceptions to
the warrant requirement.
74. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970), infra notes 116-19 and accom-
panying text; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), infra notes 78-85 and
accompanying text; Thompson, 469 U.S. at 19-20; Trupiano, 334 U.S. at 705.
75. See C. WHITEBREAD AND C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF
CASES AND CONCEPTS (1986)[hereinafter C. WHITEBREAD]. This treatise provides guidance
in terms of the underlying differences between these two lines of cases.
The differences between the two questions give rise to remarkably different an-
swers. Seldom is the conduct of searches and seizures by governmental officials
1990]
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continue to be in tension with the often drawn battle lines over
whether to adopt a new exception to the preference of a search
warrant" or expand an existing exception."
B. Scope of the Fourth Amendment
1. The Fourth Amendment Protects People not Places
An understanding of what circumstances and events trigger
fourth amendment protection is critical to an understanding of
the amendment itself, its application, and its scope. Prior to
Katz v. United States,78 the concepts of property law and tres-
pass defined when a fourth amendment event occurred. 9 In
Katz, Justice Stewart dramatically altered the definition of a
fourth amendment event in asserting that "the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places." 80 Katz involved a warrantless
interception of defendant's telephone conversation from a public
unreasonable given the surrounding facts and circumstances. The same cannot be
said, however, about the failure to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search.
The Rabinowitz/Rehnquist approach would make nearly every warrantless search
acceptable, while the Johnson/Stewart approach would validate only those war-
rantless searches that fully satisfy at least one of the narrowly-defined exceptions
to the warrant requirement.
Id. at 137. The Johnson/Stewart approach to the warrant requirement continues to be
followed with the exception that in the area of administrative searches there has been
some relaxation of a strict warrant requirement. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985) (authorizing school searches without probable cause or a warrant); Griffin v. Wis-
consin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (authorizing searches of probationer's home without
warrant).
76. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (Court adopted the good faith
exception to a search conducted under a defective warrant); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) (Court approved of warrantless stop-and-frisk searches based on reasona-
ble suspicion). Chief Justice Warren noted:
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether "probable cause" existed
to justify the search and seizure which took place. However, that is not the case...
. Instead, the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amend-
ment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id. at 20.
77. See Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 (Court expanded administrative searches to include
warrantless search of probationer's home based on reasonable grounds).
78. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
79. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (held that wiretapping did
not violate the fourth amendment as no trespass occurred and as the words which were
"seized" were not within the meaning of "things" seized within the fourth amendment).
80. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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telephone booth by FBI agents and thus did not present a tres-
pass or violation of property rights.8 1 Justice Stewart rejected
the formulation of the issues presented by the parties since both
had focused on whether the telephone booth was a "constitu-
tionally protected area."82 Having found the defendant pro-
tected by the fourth amendment, Stewart then assessed whether
the warrantless search and seizure of Katz's telephone conversa-
tion complied with constitutional standards.8 3 In finding that it
did not, he asserted that "[s]earches conducted without warrants
have been held unlawful 'notwithstanding facts unquestionably
showing probable cause,' for the Constitution requires 'that the
deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be inter-
posed between the citizen and the police . ' ."84
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion provided a test to
be applied in order to determine if fourth amendment protection
is activated. He proposed that "there is a twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that so-
ciety is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "185 Consequently,
fourth amendment protection would extend to areas which an
individual sought to preserve as private, even if the area is ac-
cessible to the public, provided this expectation of privacy is one
that society finds reasonable.
2. Fourth Amendment Protection Extends to Commercial
Establishments
The Court has defined in recent cases the extent of fourth
amendment protection in relation to commercial establishments.
See v. City of Seattle'6 recognized that fourth amendment pro-
81. Id. at 348-49. In comparison, under the Olmstead holding this event should not
have presented a fourth amendment issue.
82. Id. at 351. "But this effort to decide whether or not a given 'area,' viewed in the
abstract, is 'constitutionally protected' deflects attention from the problem presented by
this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Id.
83. Id. at 354.
84. Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765
(1983). "The Fourth Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy rather than
simply places. If inspection by police does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of
privacy, there is no 'search' subject to the Warrant Clause." Id. at 771.
86. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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tection extended to commercial establishments because "[t]he
businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitu-
tional right to go about his business free from unreasonable offi-
cial entries upon his private commercial property."87 Fourth
amendment protection of commercial establishments is based on
both the merchants' reasonable expectation of privacy in areas
within their commercial establishments from which the public is
excluded, and the Framers' intent that the fourth amendment
provide this protection.8 8 Thus, the Court asserted this protec-
tion through application of Justice Harlan's test from Katz v.
United States"9 and through an assessment of the original intent
of the Framers.
C. Issuance of a Search Warrant Requires a Neutral and De-
tached Magistrate Presented with Affidavits not Based on False
Statements
The role of the magistrate in the issuance of a search war-
rant was defined by Justice Robert Jackson in Johnson v.
United States0 as requiring the magistrate to be both neutral
87. Id. at 543. The finding that the fourth amendment protection includes commer-
cial establishments was reaffirmed in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978),
which held that:
The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings
as well as private homes. To hold otherwise would belie the origin of that Amend-
ment, and the American colonial experience .... The particular offensiveness [the
general warrant] engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen
whose premises and products were inspected for compliance with the several par-
liamentary revenue measures that most irritated the colonists .... Against this
background, it is untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was not intended
to shield places of business as well as of residence.
Id. at 311-12.
88. Cf. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1984). The Court held that the
open fields doctrine, which permits police officers to enter and search a field without a
warrant, was consistent with explicit language of the fourth amendment and consistent
with the concept of an individual's fourth amendment protection of reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy as expressed in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Court
found that the open fields doctrine was consistent with the principles of Katz as the
activities which occur in an open field are not the intimate sort of activities the amend-
ment was designed to protect. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
89. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
90. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). See supra note 69 for a brief statement of the holding in
Johnson.
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and detached."' Jackson, in writing for the Court, clearly identi-
fied the rationale behind this requirement in these oft-quoted
words:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the sup-
port of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evi-
dence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime.2
It is this magistrate who makes the determination of whether
there is probable cause to issue a search warrant. Probable cause
in the fourth amendment context has been defined to "mean
more than bare suspicion. Probable cause exists where 'the facts
and circumstances within ... [the officers'] knowledge and of
which... [the officers'] had reasonably trustworthy information
[are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being
committed." '
The Court in a series of cases including Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,9" Shadwick v. City of Tampa,9" and Lo-Ji Sales,
Inc. v. New York,96 provided further guidance in defining when a
magistrate is properly neutral and detached. These cases, when
91. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14.
92. Id. See also United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (limited
searches incident to arrest).
93. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). More recently, the Court
has stated: "probable cause is a fluid concept - turning on the assessment of probabili-
ties in particular factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set
of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
94. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Search warrant was defective as it was issued by the Chief
Prosecutor of the state who "simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality
with regard to [his] own investigations .. " Id. at 450.
95. 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (municipal court clerks found to be constitutionally accept-
able to issue warrants). "Whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail, it is
clear that they require severance and disengagement from activities of law enforcement."
Id. at 350.
96. 442 U.S. 319 (1979). The magistrate, who had accompanied the police in a six-
hour search of an "adult" bookstore in order to determine which items were to be seized,
was found not to be neutral and detached as he had "allowed himself to become a mem-
ber, if not the leader, of the search party which was essentially a police operation." Id. at
327.
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viewed together, present the concept of the magistrate as being
an independent entity who does not act as a "rubber stamp" to
police requests, but rather as a critical intermediary in securing
an individual's fourth amendment protection.
Given this concept of the independent role of the magis-
trate, it is critical that the affidavits presented to him not be
based on false statements. This issue was addressed by the
Court in Franks v. Delaware9 7 when it held that searches based
on warrants procured through false statements to the magistrate
must be suppressed. 8 The Court found that if a defendant can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a false state-
ment knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for
the truth, was included in the warrant affidavit, and if the false
statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, then
"the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search
excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on
the face of the affidavit." 99
D. Exceptions to the Search Warrant Requirement
As recognized by the Court, a search "without a warrant...
'can survive constitutional inhibition only upon a showing that
the surrounding facts brought it within one of the exceptions to
the rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant.' ,, This
Note will examine exceptions to the search warrant requirement
that are presented in Murray v. United States.101 Specifically,
these will include the following: The automobile exception, the
exigent circumstances exception, and the plain view exception.
97. 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (defendant was entitled to a hearing to determine if false
statements included in the warrant affidavit were necessary to the finding of probable
cause, and if they were necessary, then the evidence was subject to the exclusionary
rule).
98. Id. at 155-56.
99. Id. at 156.
100. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964) (citations omitted).
101. 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
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1. Automobile Exception
In United States v. Ross,1"2 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its 1925 holding in Carroll v. United States °3 which permitted a
warrantless search of an automobile provided such search was
based on the authorities' probable cause belief that the vehicle
contained seizable evidence. The Court limited this exception to
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment to
automobiles or other vehicles and did not extend this exception
to any movable container found in a public place.' °4 The scope
of this exception "applies only to searches of vehicles that are
supported by probable cause."' 5 In addition, the Court found
that "[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully
stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehi-
cle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search."' 06 The essence of this exception is that the probable
cause determination must be related to the vehicle as the object
which contains the seizable evidence. The basis of this exception
is both the reduced expectation of privacy which society has in
its vehicles 0 7 and, more critically, the pragmatic problem of the
easy mobility of vehicles, which would make it difficult for the
police to return and execute a search warrant.'08
2. Exigent Circumstances
The concept of searching without a warrant based on an
emergency situation or exigent circumstances has a long com-
102. 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (warrantless search of vehicle based on probable cause that
seizable evidence was present in the vehicle found not to be in violation of the fourth
amendment as search is reasonable and as society has a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy in vehicles).
103. 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (vehicle may be searched without a warrant provided
search is based on probable cause because this warrantless search is reasonable within
the meaning of the fourth amendment).
104. Ross, 456 U.S. at 819. The argument that a warrantless search of an automobile
believed to be transporting contraband justifies a warrantless search of any movable
container believed to be carrying an illicit substance was squarely rejected in United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977) (rejecting warrantless search of footlocker
inside of vehicle).
105. Ross, 456 U.S. at 809.
106. Id. at 825.
107. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12.
108. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
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mon-law history and continues to be an exception to the warrant
requirement. Examples would include entering a building or
home to fight a fire,"'9 chase a suspect, " or prevent the destruc-
tion of evidence.1 The basic concept of exigent circumstances is
described in Warden v. Hayden'12 in which Justice Brennan
found hot pursuit to be an exigent circumstance that made entry
and search for the robber imperative. 1" 3 Brennan commented
that the fourth amendment does not require the police to delay
an investigation when presented with an emergency need, " 4
since "[u]nder the circumstances of this case, 'the exigencies of
the situation made that course imperative.' ""
In Vale v. Louisiana,"6 the Court indicated that the con-
cern over the destruction of evidence should not automatically
allow warrantless entry and searches.1 ' Officers, when possible,
should obtain a warrant or use less restrictive means such as se-
curing the premises from outside.118 The Court, in reversing the
conviction, expressed the policy that police should not create
their own exigent circumstances in order to justify a warrantless
entry and search." 9 The Third Circuit in United States v.
109. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). "A burning building clearly presents an
exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry 'reasonable.' . . . And
once in a building for this purpose, firefighters may seize evidence of arson that is in
plain view." Id. at 509.
110. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (Court found the fourth amendment
consistent with common-law rule which permits hot pursuit of suspect without warrant).
But cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (Court held that absent other exigent
circumstances officers may not enter a home to make a routine felony arrest without a
warrant).
111. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (warrantless and unannounced entry of
dwelling by police to prevent imminent destruction of evidence found to be within exi-
gent circumstances exception).
112. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
113. Id. at 298.
114. Id. at 298-99.
115. Id. at 298 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). See
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), which answered the question of whether
the defendant, by her act of retreating into her house, could thwart an otherwise proper
arrest. The Court held that she could not and cited Warden. Id. at 42.
116. 399 U.S. 30 (1970). Vale presented a situation where the police, having ob-
served a probable drug transaction, arrested the defendant outside his house and pro-
ceeded to enter and search the house. Id.
117. Id. at 33-34.
118. Id. at 34.
119. Id. at 35.
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Rubin12 ° analyzed the direction provided by the Vale Court on
the exigent circumstances created by the threat of loss or de-
struction of evidence. The Third Circuit recognized that exigent
circumstances are fact sensitive and that the necessities pro-
vided by the circumstances to the search must be scrutinized. 121
The court listed the following factors as relevant:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time neces-
sary to obtain a warrant; (2) reasonable belief that the contra-
band is about to be removed; (3) the possibility of danger to the
police officers guarding the site of the contraband while a search
warrant is sought; (4) information indicating the possessors of the
contraband are aware that the police are on their trail; and (5)
the ready destructibility of the contraband and the knowledge
"that efforts to dispose of narcotics and to escape are characteris-
tic behavior of persons engaged in the narcotics traffic." '122
This analysis of the exigent circumstances exception indicates a
heavy burden on the government to justify a warrantless entry.
This justification requires articulable facts to support the find-
ing that there was a compelling necessity for immediate entry to
prevent destruction of evidence.
3. Plain View Doctrine
The Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire2 3 recognized that
under certain circumstances police may seize evidence in plain
120. 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973).
121. Id. at 268.
122. Id. at 268-69 (quoting United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992, 998-99 (2d Cir.
1971) (other citations omitted)). See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.5(b), at 656-71 (1987 & Supp. 1988) for detailed analysis of
Rubin test and exigent circumstance based on destruction or removal of evidence.
123. 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (search invalidated because search warrant authorized by
chief prosecutor who was, by definition, not neutral and detached). The government as-
serted that, if arguendo the search warrant was invalid, the evidence from the defend-
ant's automobile seized by police should not be suppressed as the automobile was in
"plain view." Id. at 457-64. The Court rejected this assertion because "the 'plain view'
exception cannot justify the police seizure of the Pontiac car in this case. The police had
ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant; they knew the automobile's exact descrip-
tion and location well in advance; they intended to seize it when they came upon Coo-
lidge's property." Id. at 472. See Taylor v. United States, 236 U.S. 1 (1932) for an early
example of the limits of the plain view doctrine. In Taylor, evidence of contraband
whisky in defendant's garage procured by police's warrantless search was inadmissible
even though police smelled whisky and saw through a small opening in cardboard cases
1990]
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view without a warrant. 2 " This seizure is consistent with the
fourth amendment as long as "the initial intrusion that brings
the police within plain view of such an article is supported...
by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
.. 25 The Court placed two limitations on the doctrine. The
first limitation is that the mere fact that evidence is seen in
plain view is not sufficient to justify a warrantless seizure.126 The
second limitation is that the discovery of evidence in plain view
must be inadvertent. 2 7 Consequently, in Coolidge the seizure of
the evidence in question was not covered by the plain view doc-
trine as police were not on the premises inadvertently. 28
E. The Exclusionary Rule
1. Origin from Weeks v. United States to Mapp v. Ohio
The rule requiring the exclusion of evidence at trial which
was procured as a result of a constitutional violation was estab-
lished for the federal court system in Weeks v. United States.2 e
indications that the cases were likely to contain whisky bottles. Id. at 5. "Prohibition
officers may rely on a distinctive odor as a physical fact indicative of possible crime; but
its presence alone does not strip the owner of a building of constitutional guaranties
against unreasonable search." Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
124. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465.
125. Id. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (Court indicated that officers
must legally be in a place when they first observe the item and if they seize the item,
they must have legal access to it).
126. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468. "This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle..
that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent
'exigent circumstances.'" Id.
127. Id. at 469.
128. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 472. Brown, 460 U.S. at 730, further expanded the limita-
tions of the plain view doctrine when the Court indicated that the officer must, when he
first observes the item, be legally in the place from which he gains that observation, and
if he seizes the item, he must have legal access to it. Id. at 737.
129. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), rev'd in part, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)
(Elkins rejected Weeks' "silver platter" doctrine, which had allowed the admissibility of
evidence seized by state police and provided to federal authorities). Despite its partial
reversal by Elkins, the Weeks decision effectively overruled Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585 (1904), which had adhered to the common-law rule that a court would not in-
quire as to the legality of how evidence was obtained, but to its relevance. "'Evidence
which is pertinent to the issue is admissible, although it may have been procured in an
irregular or even in an illegal manner .... For the trespass he [the trespasser] may be
held responsible civilly, and perhaps criminally; but his testimony is not thereby ren-
dered incompetent.'" Adams, 192 U.S. at 596 (quoting Commonwealth v. Acton, 165
Mass. 11, 42 N.E. 329 (1895)).
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Justice Day reversed the trial court's denial of Weeks' petition
for return of property removed from his room by United States
marshals during an illegal search. The property items in ques-
tion were to be entered as evidence in Weeks' trial for the sale of
lottery tickets through the U.S. mail. Justice Day noted "[t]he
tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country
to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizure and enforced
confessions ... should find no sanction in the judgments of the
courts .... ",130 He further maintained that "[t]o sanction such
proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest
neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Con-
stitution, intended for the protection of the people against such
unauthorized action."'- 1 Thus, Justice Day indicated that the re-
quirement of suppressing the evidence is both a personal right of
the individual whose property was illegally seized and an act
that is required to maintain the integrity of the court.. 2 This
recognition of the importance of the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem was viewed by several Supreme Court justices in the early
twentieth century as the prime basis of the exclusionary rule. 33
130. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
131. Id. at 394.
132. Over the next 11 years, the Court developed the exclusionary rule for federal
courts to exclude all evidence from illegal searches. In Weeks, the Court ordered the
documents suppressed since petitioner had requested their return prior to trial. Id. at
398. In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), the Court ordered documents sup-
pressed where the petitioner had not requested their return prior to trial as the peti-
tioner was unaware of the government's possession of the documents until trial. The
Court found that the rule of practice requiring prior request for return "must not be
allowed for any technical reason to prevail over a constitutional right." Id. at 313 (em-
phasis added). Finally, in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), the Court ordered
the suppression of a can of cocaine illegally seized from petitioner's home without requir-
ing petitioner to apply for return of the contraband item. The decisions prior to Agnello
had not addressed the issue of contraband property, in the situation where to assert
one's property right and request the return of the property would be inconsistent with
the position maintained by the petitioner at trial, that he was not the possessor of the
illegal substance. Thus, it was critical in Agnello for petitioner to be able to suppress the
evidence directly. The Court in Agnello cited as authority Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisi-
tion of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." Id. at 392.
133. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (majority held that
wiretapping did not violate the fourth amendment as no trespass occurred and as the
words which were "seized" were not within the meaning of "things" seized within the
fourth amendment), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Justice
1990]
21
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:167
In Wolf v. Colorado,13 4 the exclusionary rule was initially
held as not being "derived from the explicit requirement of the
Fourth Amendment"'18 5 and, therefore, was a judicially created
remedy.' s6 Consequently, in Wolf, although the fourth amend-
ment itself was held applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment, 37 the exclusionary rule was not.1 8' This de-
nial of the application of the exclusionary rule to the states was
overruled in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio."a9 In this seminal case, Dolly
Mapp was convicted in state court of possession of pornographic
books14 0 obtained through a particularly egregious warrantless
search"4 of her boarding house."12
Justice Clark, in writing for the majority, rejected the Wolf
contention that the exclusionary rule was not required by the
fourth amendment. 43 Clark maintained that without the Weeks
exclusionary rule, "the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be 'a form of words,' valueless and
undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable
human liberties .... "', Consequently, he found that the exclu-
sionary rule was enforceable against the states through the due
Brandeis maintained in his dissent that "[iln a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.... If the govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). See also Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927).
134. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Defendant's conviction of conspiring to commit abortions
was affirmed even though the state had unlawfully obtained evidence in violation of the
fourth amendment. The Court found that the exclusionary rule was "a matter of judicial
implication." Id. at 25.
135. Id. at 28.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 27-28.
138. Id. at 33.
139. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
140. Id. at 643.
141. Id. at 644-45. Mapp involved a forcible entry into the home, a denial of access
to counsel, a bogus search warrant, and excessive physical confrontation and confine-
ment. Id.
142. See Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Develop-
ment and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLum. L.
REv. 1365 (1983) for an in-depth review of Mapp v. Ohio.
143. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56.
144. Id. at 655.
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment1 4 5 and that the rule
was "logically and constitutionally necessary . . 146 Justice
Clark in Mapp further echoed the Weeks decision by noting
that the fourth amendment is an individual right and the exclu-
sionary rule is necessary to maintain judicial integrity.147
Over the seventy-five years since Weeks, the Court has set
forth three rationales for the exclusionary rule.14 The first ra-
tionale was based on the personal right of the individual whose
property was searched or seized in violation of the fourth
amendment. 4 9 The second rationale was that the exclusionary
rule was necessary to maintain the integrity of the Court. 150 The
third rationale was based on the concept that the rule deters
police from violating the commands of the Constitution.151 More
145. Id.
[Wlithout that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from
all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty.'"
Id. (citation omitted).
146. Id. at 656. See Stewart, supra note 142, at 1380-89 for review of the constitu-
tional basis for the exclusionary rule. See also Cann & Egbert, The Exclusionary Rule:
Its Necessity in Constitutional Democracy, 23 How. L.J. 299 (1980).
147. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
148. The following articles provide an extensive treatment of the rationales behind
the exclusionary rule issue which is beyond the scope of this Note: Cann & Egbert, The
Exclusionary Rule: Its Necessity in Constitutional Democracy, 23 How. L.J. 299 (1980);
Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) about the "Costs" of
the Exclusionary Rule: the NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 Am. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 611; Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest on a
"Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565
(1983); Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Viola-
tions: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEo. L.J. 1361 (1981); Wasserstrom &
Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But was it a Fair Trial? 22 Am. CRIM.
L. REV. 85 (1984); Comment, Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 57 TUL. L. REv. 648 (1983).
149. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
150. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960);
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33-34 (1927); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392 (1914).
151. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (denying habeas corpus relief
where the state had provided full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim); Lin-
kletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965) (denying retrospective effect of Mapp as it
would not serve the deterrent purpose of the rule); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (holding that
evidence obtained by state officers in violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissi-
ble in federal court). "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to
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recently, the Court has focused on the deterrence function of the
exclusionary rule as the prime underlying basis of the rule.1"'
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule
The Court, having focused on the deterrence function as the
primary basis for the exclusionary rule, has reviewed the utiliza-
tion of this rule through a cost-benefit analysis approach. This
method of analysis was first proposed in United States v. Calan-
dra1 53 where Justice Powell found that a witness before a grand
jury could not refuse to answer after immunity had been granted
on the grounds that the questions were derived from evidence
obtained in an unlawful search.lH Powell, consequently, pro-
posed a cost-benefit analysis approach based on the rationale
that: one, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress
the injury of the search victim;1 55 two, the purpose is to deter
future unlawful police conduct;15" and three, "the rule is a judi-
cially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a per-
sonal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. 1 5 7 Powell was,
therefore, led to the position that the Court must "weigh the
potential injury to the historic role and functions of the grand
jury against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in this
context."158 Justice Powell found only incremental deterrence
when the exclusionary rule is applied to grand jury proceed-
ings. 15 Therefore, he found it insufficient to justify the cost of
deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively availa-
ble way - by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id.
152. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (adoption of the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule primarily based on the premise that suppressing evi-
dence in question would not serve to deter illegal police conduct).
153. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
154. Id. at 351-52.
155. Id. at 347.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 348.
158. Id. at 349.
159. Id. at 351. Justice Powell found that it was "unrealistic to assume that applica-
tion of the rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly further that goal [of deter-
ring police misconduct]. Such an extension would deter only police investigation con-
sciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury
investigation." Id.
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excluding the evidence from these proceedings. 160
3. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
In United States v. Leon, 6' the Supreme Court adopted the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 62 This exception
applies when officers act in reasonable reliance upon a search
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate even
though the warrant is subsequently found to be invalid.6 3 The
holding essentially follows the logic of the United States v. Ca-
landra' balancing approach. 6 ' The exclusionary rule was again
found to be a judicially created remedy, and, as the wrong con-
demned by the amendment was fully accomplished by the origi-
nal illegal search or seizure, no new violation occurs by virtue of
the further use of the evidence. 16' Justice White commented
that "[t]he substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary
rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long
been a source of concern.' 7 Having justified a cost-benefit anal-
160. Id. See Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Con-
stitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974) for a discussion of Calandra which
is beyond the scope of this Note.
161. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 914. The case involved a search and seizure of large quantities of drugs
pursuant to a deficient search warrant which was not based on probable cause. The
Court found that the police acted in good faith; the Court finding that the police had no
reason to suspect that the warrant was deficient and they were not involved in mislead-
ing the magistrate in the issuance of the warrant. Id.
164. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
165. Leon, 468 U.S. at 908-09. "Accordingly, '[a]s with any remedial device, the ap-
plication of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served.'" Id. (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348). "We con-
clude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence ob-
tained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant
cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion." Id. at 922.
166. Id. at 906.
167. Id. at 907. See id. at 907 n.6 which reviewed recent commentaries on the empir-
ical cost of the exclusionary rule. Justice White disagreed with the conclusion of these
commentaries and asserted:
Many of these researchers have concluded that the impact of the exclusionary rule
is insubstantial, but the small percentages with which they deal mask a large abso-
lute number of felons who are released because the cases against them were based
in part on illegal searches or seizures .... Because we find that the rule can have
no substantial deterrent effect in the sorts of situations under consideration in
this case .. .we conclude that it cannot pay its way in those situations.
25
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ysis approach, Justice White then reviewed whether the result of
this analysis indicates whether the good faith exception should
be accepted. 168 He found that the benefits of applying the exclu-
sionary rule were minimal, and, therefore, the good faith excep-
tion was adopted.'69 The Court limited the good faith exception
by requiring that the officer's reliance on the deficient warrant
be reasonable and by recognizing that there are some circum-
stances where an officer "will have no reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that the warrant was properly issued. '1 70
4. Objection to the Exclusionary Rule
The major objection to the exclusionary rule was articulated
by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.'7' The basis of this
objection is the fact that the exclusionary rule results in the sup-
pression of evidence that is relevant and often essential to ob-
tain a conviction. 172 He interpreted the purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule as resting "on a theory that suppression of evidence in
these circumstances was imperative to deter law enforcement
authorities from using improper methods to obtain evidence.' ' 7 3
He further proposed that "[i]f an effective alternative remedy is
available, concern for official observance of the law does not re-
quire adherence to the exclusionary rule.' 7' After noting that
Id. at 907 n.6.
168. Id. at 908-26.
169. Id. at 922. Justice White viewed the deterrence factor only from the point of
view of the officer making the search, not from the point of view of the entire criminal
justice system. Id. at 915-17. Thus, suppression of evidence due to an error by a judge or
a magistrate would not have a deterrent effect on the police and, consequently, a cost-
benefit analysis would indicate that this evidence should not be suppressed. Id. at 917.
See also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (decided the same day as
Leon). "[Tihe exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the
search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid .... Id. at 987-88.
170. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. See Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986)
and Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405 (1986) for divergent opinions on Leon.
171. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (individuals entitled to a cause of action under the fourth
amendment if they have been damaged as a result of federal agent's violation of the
amendment).
172. Id. at 413 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 414.
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the exclusionary rule has rested on the deterrent rationale, Bur-
ger stated that "it is both conceptually sterile and practically
ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective. ' 17 As proof of
this proposition, he indicated that no empirical evidence existed
to support the claim that the rule actually deters illegal conduct
of law enforcement officials. 17 6
Numerous empirical studies have been conducted over the
last ten years to determine the cost to society of the exclusion-
ary rule.177 Various studies have found that between 0.8% to
2.4% of federal felony arrests are lost as a result of the exclu-
sionary rule.18 Most recently, the American Bar Association's
Section of Criminal Justice has issued an interim report review-
ing whether constitutional protection under the Bill of Rights
prevents effective crime control. 7 9 In the preparation of this re-
port, the committee, established by the Criminal Justice Section
in 1986, conducted a methodologically developed opinion poll of
nearly 1,000 police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
judges, and other participants in the criminal justice system.8 0
The committee also held hearings to focus on whether constitu-
tional protection serves to protect criminals from prosecution, to
prevent police from solving crimes, and to frustrate the prosecu-
tor's ability to obtain convictions. 18' The committee's findings
were summarized as follows:
Constitutional restrictions, such as the exclusionary rule and Mi-
randa, do not significantly handicap police and prosecutors in
their efforts to arrest, prosecute and obtain convictions of crimi-
nal defendants for most serious crimes. Rather, the major prob-
lem for the criminal justice system, identified by all criminal jus-
tice respondents to the Committee, is lack of sufficient resources.
175. Id. at 415.
176. Id. at 416.
177. See R. VAM DUIZEND, L. SuTTON, & C. CARTER, THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS:
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES (1983); Nardulli, supra note 148; Schles-
inger, The exclusionary rule: have proponents proven that it is a deterrent to police?,
62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979); Wilkey, The exclusionary rule: why suppress valid evidence?,
62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978).
178. See Nardulli, supra note 148, at 590.
179. Criminal Justice in Crisis, ABA CRIM. JUS. SEC., [hereinafter Criminal Justice
in Crisis] (transcript on file at Pace University School of Law Library).
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id.
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The entire system is starved: police, prosecution, criminal de-
fense, courts and corrections. As currently funded, the criminal
justice system cannot provide the quality of justice the public le-
gitimately expects and the people working within the system wish
to deliver.18 2
It was noted in the American Bar Association Journal review of
this report that "[t]heir opinion was corroborated by the com-
mittee's examination of numerous exclusionary rule studies. Ac-
cording to these studies, only 0.6% to 2.35% of all adult felony
arrests are screened out before filing or dismissed by the court
because of illegal searches."18
F. The Independent Source Doctrine
The independent source doctrine 1 4 and its related corollary
doctrines - attenuated connection and inevitable discov-
ery - were developed by the Court to provide both a frame-
work for the appropriate application of the exclusionary rule
and a limitation on the extent of the application of the rule. Af-
ter the development of the exclusionary rule, the Court ex-
pressed concern that not every constitutional violation should
automatically result in all evidence being suppressed18 and, con-
sequently, developed these doctrines to serve as effective excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule.
1. Origin of Independent Source Doctrine - Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States
The independent source doctrine, as a justification for not
applying the exclusionary rule, was first set forth in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States.86 Justice Holmes in his opinion
stated "[i]f knowledge of ... [facts illegally obtained] is gained
from an independent source they may be proved like any others,
182. Id. at 4.
183. Raven, Crime and the Bill of Rights: Separating Myth from Reality, 74 A.B.A.
J. 8 (1988).
184. See Annotation, "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Doctrine Excluding Evidence
Derived from Information Gained in Illegal Search, 43 A.L.R.3D 385 (1972 & Supp.
1988) for extensive background material on independent source doctrine.
185. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
186. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong can-
not be used by it in the way proposed. ' 187 The issue in
Silverthorne was whether the petitioner could be held in con-
tempt of court for failing to obey subpoenas ordering production
of documents which had previously been illegally seized by
United States marshals and returned by court order to the peti-
tioner. 188 The Court reversed the district court judgment, finding
that the government had gained knowledge of the documents il-
legally and that without this knowledge the government would
not have been able to issue a subpoena. 8 9 Justice Holmes as-
serted that to allow the government to violate the fourth amend-
ment by illegally seizing items, returning them, and then finally
using the knowledge gained as a result of the illegal search to
subpoena the same items, would "[reduce] the Fourth Amend-
ment to a form of words."1 90
Traditional independent source doctrine required that the
illegal act not be connected to the actual acquisition of the evi-
dence or knowledge in question. As Justice Holmes expressed in
Silverthorne,
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all. Of
course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become
sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others ....'9'
The Silverthorne case presented the independent source doc-
trine as applying to evidence that has two separate and distinct
sources: one, an illegal source as a result of a violation of a con-
stitutional right by the government; and two, a totally separate
source not connected to that constitutional violation. 92 A "but
for" test provides an analytical framework for the application of
the independent source doctrine. If "but for" the constitutional
violation the evidence would not have been obtained, then the
187. Id. at 392.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 391.
190. Id. at 392.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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evidence should not be admitted. Thus, under a strict applica-
tion of this doctrine, if there is any causal connection between
the constitutional violation and the obtaining of the evidence,
the evidence must be suppressed.
2. Attenuated Connection Development
a. Nardone v. United States
The problem with the independent source doctrine, as set
forth in Silverthorne,93 is that evidence is suppressed if there is
any degree of causal connection between the violation and the
acquisition of evidence. This rigid application of the indepen-
dent source doctrine was addressed by Justice Frankfurter in
Nardone v. United States. 94 The issue presented in Nardone
was whether the court had improperly refused to allow the de-
fendant to examine the prosecution regarding how it had used
information secured in violation of an illegal telephone inter-
cept.195 As pointed out in the case, the problem with the applica-
tion of the Silverthorne independent source doctrine was that
"[slophisticated argument may prove a causal connection be-
tween information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the
Government's proof."'196 Thus, Silverthorne would hold that if
there were any connection between the illicit wire-tapping and
the acquisition of the evidence, the evidence should be sup-
pressed. This would then lead to detailed analysis of whether
there was any causal linkage between the illegal action and the
actual attainment of information or evidence. The Court re-
jected this approach and recognized that "[a]s a matter of good
sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint.11 7
193. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
194. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
195. Id. at 339.
196. Id. at 341.
197. Id. See Stratton, The Attenuation Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A
Study in Attenuated Principle and Dissipated Logic, 75 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 139
(1984). This article provides a sound analysis of the attenuation exception doctrine and
concludes that the attenuation exception is inconsistent with the fourth amendment be-
cause it permits use of evidence discovered through illegal search and seizures. Id. at 142.
The attenuated connection doctrine is also referred to as the attenuation exception to
the exclusionary rule, Id.
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Nardone instructs that even if there is some causal connec-
tion between the information obtained and the illegal act, it
should not result in the suppression of the evidence, provided
the connection is so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the
illegal act.198 No test was developed in Nardone, however, to ad-
dress the degree of attenuation required and the factors to be
assessed in order to determine if the taint has been dissipated.
b. Wong Sun v. United States
The classic application of the attenuated connection doc-
trine is illustrated by Wong Sun v. United States. e99 In Wong
Sun, petitioner James Wah Toy's statement to the police and
the subsequent seizure of heroin from Johnny Yee were consid-
ered "fruits" of the illegal entry, 00 but petitioner Wong Sun's
unsigned confession was not considered "fruits" of an illegal ar-
rest by the government.2 0 ' Both statements, in fact, had a simi-
lar cause-and-effect relationship to the illegal fourth amendment
violations. A "but for" analysis of these facts would find all of
the evidence inadmissible since "but for" the original illegal en-
try into Toy's apartment and "but for" the illegal arrest of
Wong Sun, none of the evidence would have been obtained. In
analyzing Toy's statement, the Court found no intervening inde-
pendent act of free will on Toy's part. Specifically, Toy's state-
ment closely followed the illegal entry and Toy was handcuffed
and under arrest. 02 In addition, since it was Toy's statement
that led police directly to Johnny Yee, the heroin seized at Yee's
was also inadmissible against Toy as "fruits" obtained by the
exploitation of the illegal entry into Toy's apartment.20 3
The Court, conversely, did find that Wong Sun's confession
198. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
199. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In Wong Sun, federal narcotics agents made an illegal
entry into the residence of "Blackie" Toy and illegally arrested him. After the arrest,
Toy told the agents he had no narcotics but Johnny Yee did. Acting on this information,
the agents entered Yee's premises and obtained narcotics from him. Yee told the agents
upon subsequent questioning that he had received the narcotics from Toy and Wong
Sun. The narcotics were later admitted against Toy and Wong Sun.
200. Id. at 487-88.
201. Id. at 491.
202. Id. at 486.
203. Id. at 488.
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was purged of the primary taint because the confession occurred
several days after his illegal arrest, and was, concomitantly, the
result of Wong Sun's voluntary return to the police.2 °0 Thus, the
fact that Wong Sun was not in custody and had a significant
period to reflect on the situation attenuated the causal connec-
tion between the fourth amendment violation and the confes-
sion. Justice Brennan provided direction in Wong Sun, in terms
of evaluating whether the evidence is "fruit of the poisonous
tree, 2 05 by stating that the appropriate question is " 'whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploita-
tion of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distin-
guishable to be purged of the primary taint.' "206
c. Brown v. Illinois
Further development of the attenuated connection analysis
is presented in Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in
Brown v. Illinois.20 The petitioner in Brown had been arrested
without probable cause and without a warrant, resulting in a
particularly egregious fourth amendment violation.2 08 The ques-
tion presented was the admissibility of two in-custody inculpa-
tory statements made by Brown after he had been given Mi-
randa2 9 warnings. The State Supreme Court of Illinois held
that the giving of the Miranda warnings to Brown prior to inter-
rogation had served to break the causal connection between the
illegal arrest and Brown's statements.2 0
The United States Supreme Court rejected the per se rule
204. Id. at 491.
205. Justice Frankfurter coined the phrase, "fruit of the poisonous tree" in Nardone
y. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The metaphor used by Justice Frankfurter
was that the "poisonous tree" is the fourth amendment violation and the "fruit" is the
evidence or knowledge gained by that violation which, therefore, is also poisonous. Id.
206. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).
207. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
208. Id. at 592. Petitioner had been arrested at gunpoint without probable cause
and without a warrant by officers who were illegally in his apartment in the evening
awaiting petitioner's return. Id.
209. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Court mandated that prior to all cus-
todial interrogations the four-fold warnings be given in order to safeguard the privilege
against self-incrimination).
210. People v. Brown, 56 Ill. 2d 312, 317, 307 N.E.2d 356, 358 (1974).
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which had been accepted by the Illinois court.2 11 The Court also
declined to adopt the "but for" approach, under which it would
have found the confession inadmissible; "but for" the illegal ar-
rest, no confession would have been given and, therefore, the
confession should be excluded.212
Instead, the Court followed the guidelines established under
Wong Sun v. United States-whether a confession is the prod-
uct of free will must be "answered on the facts of each case. '213
The Court proceeded to develop the applicable test to determine
whether statements are a product of a free will and of such a
tenuous connection that the taint of the statements had dissi-
pated. Having indicated that "[n]o single fact is dispositive, ' '2 1
the Court went on to list the following factors:
The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in de-
termining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of
an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered.
The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the
presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the pur-
pose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant.2 15
This test focuses on the different factors to be reviewed in deter-
mining whether the causal relationship between the evidence
and the constitutional violation is sufficiently attenuated for the
taint to be dissipated.
3. Inevitable Discovery - Nix v. Williams
In 1984, the Supreme Court expressly adopted the inevita-
ble discovery exception to the exclusionary rule2 1 6 in its opinion
211. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603. The United States Supreme Court rejected the per se
rule which in this context would find that the Miranda warnings alone would be suffi-
cient to break the causal connection and make the statements a product of free will. Id.
The Court found that "the Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the
act sufficiently a product of free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the
causal connection between the illegality and the confession. They cannot assure in every
case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited." Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. 422 U.S. at 603 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963)
(Wong Sun Court ruled that probable cause must be "measured by the facts of the par-
ticular case")).
214. Id. at 603.
215. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). at 603-04 (citation omitted).
216. This case involved two petitions to the United States Supreme Court for writs
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in Nix v. Williams. 21 7 The facts of Nix involved the Christmas
Eve disappearance of a ten year old girl from Des Moines,
Iowa.218 Several days later, Williams was arrested and arraigned
in Davenport, Iowa in connection with this disappearance and
presumptive murder. 19 At that time, police were searching for
the child.220 This search involved over 200 volunteers and police
personnel who were following a systematic planned search pat-
tern to locate either the child or the child's body.2 2 Williams, on
the trip from Davenport to Des Moines in a police vehicle, was
given a "Christian Burial Speech 2 22 by a police officer and, as a
result, made incriminating statements which guided the police
to the location of the body.223
Petitioner Williams was convicted in state court. Subse-
quently, Williams twice petitioned for, and was granted, writs of
habeas corpus in federal court.224 On his first petition, the Su-
preme Court, in Brewer v. Williams,23 affirmed the court of ap-
peals' and the district court's judgment that the defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated and that
the incriminating statements obtained through this violation
were not admissible at trial.226 Consequently, Williams was tried
for a second time in state court and was again convicted of
of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court granted both petitions. The case is cited as Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) on its first petition, and is cited as Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431 (1984) on its second petition. For the purposes of this discussion, the article will
refer to this case generally as Nix v. Williams.
217. 467 U.S. at 444.
218. Id. at 434.
219. Id. at 435.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 392-93. The "Christian Burial Speech" given by the police
bfficer to Williams indicated that the decent act would be to tell the officer the location
of the body in order that the victim could receive a proper Christian burial. Emphasis in
this recitation included addressing Williams as "Reverend;" noting the young age of the
victim; and finally, reminding Williams of the fact that the victim's body would be bur-
ied by an expected snow fall and that "the parents of this little girl should be entitled to
a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas
[Elve and murdered." Id. at 393.
223. Id. at 405-06.
224. Id. at 394 (1977). See supra note 216.
225. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
226. Id. at 406.
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murder.227
At Williams' second trial, Williams sought to suppress the
evidence obtained from the body and all evidence related to the
discovery of the body as "fruits" of the prior sixth amendment
violation.228 The Iowa state court admitted the evidence after
taking the lead suggested in Brewer that the evidence "might
well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been
discovered in any event ... ."229
In Nix v. Williams, 23 0 the Supreme Court reviewed the
grant of habeas corpus relief by the Eighth Circuit after Wil-
liams' second trial23 ' and rejected the circuit court's requirement
that police must act in good faith in order for a court to consider
the application of the independent source doctrine.2 32 Chief Jus-
tice Burger, writing for the Court, asserted that the core ration-
ale for the exclusionary rule is to prevent the government from
being in a better position to convict a suspect because of illegal
conduct of its police officers. 233 However, "[t]he independent
source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has been dis-
covered by means wholly independent of any constitutional vio-
lation" 234 because the police should not be put in a worse posi-
tion than they would have been without the police error or
misconduct. 23 5 Burger recognized the functional similarity be-
tween the doctrines of independent source and inevitable discov-
227. Nix, 467 U.S. at 437-38.
228. Id.
229. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 406 n.12.
230. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
231. Id. at 434.
232. Id. at 445-46. "The requirement that the prosecution must prove the absence of
bad faith, imposed here by the Court of Appeals, would place courts in the position of
withholding from juries relevant and undoubted truth that would have been available to
police absent any unlawful police activity." Id. at 445. "In these circumstances, the socie-
tal costs of the exclusionary rule far outweigh any possible benefits to deterrence that a
good-faith requirement might produce." Id. at 446.
233. Id. at 442-43.
234. Id. at 443.
235. Id. In his opinion, Justice Burger reasoned that:
[tihe independent source doctrine teaches us that the interest of society in deter-
ring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all
probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the
same, not a worse, position than they would have been in if no police error or
misconduct had occurred.
1990]
35
PACE LAW REVIEW
ery and noted that "while the independent source exception
would not justify admission of evidence in this case, its rationale
is wholly consistent with and justifies our adoption of the ulti-
mate or inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary
rule."2 6 Thus, the inevitable discovery principle is that evidence
acquired illegally will not be suppressed if the government can
establish that the evidence would have inevitably been discov-
ered by the government through legal means.
The significant difference between the independent source
doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine is that in the in-
evitable discovery doctrine, the evidence is acquired pursuant to
a constitutional or statutory violation by the government. Thus,
in cases presenting inevitable discovery issues, it is clear that the
evidence seized was the direct result of illegal action by the gov-
ernment. The Court argued that if the core rationale of the ex-
clusionary rule is to deter illegal police conduct, and if the costs
of this application of the exclusionary rule are significant to soci-
ety and the benefits of deterrence of police misconduct are mini-
mal, then in inevitable discovery situations, that core rationale
does not exist.2 37
4. Application of Independent Source Doctrine to War-
rantless Searches followed by Warrant-Authorized Searches
a. The "But For" Analysis in Segura v. United States
Segura v. United States, 38 which was decided less than one
month after Nix v. Williams,239 presented a warrantless illegal
search followed by a warrant-authorized search of the same
apartment. New York Drug Enforcement Task Force agents had
been involved in a surveillance of petitioners which resulted in
the arrest of Parra and Rivudalla-Vidal, who were suspected of
illegal drug activity.24 0 Following their arrests these two individ-
uals provided information supporting the agents' belief that
drugs would be found in Andres Segura's apartment." 1 Conse-
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
239. 467 U.S. 431 (1984). See supra notes 216-37 and accompanying text.
240. Segura, 468 U.S. at 799-800.
241. Id. at 800.
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quently, the Assistant United States Attorney authorized the ar-
rest of Segura but indicated that a search warrant would proba-
bly not be obtained until the following day due to the lateness of
the hour.42 Agents were instructed to secure the premises to
prevent the destruction of evidence. That evening, agents ar-
rested Segura in the lobby of his apartment building.2 43 After
the arrest, they took him to his apartment and entered the
apartment without requesting or receiving permission.24  The
agents only conducted a limited security search of the apartment
and, in the process, observed various drug paraphernalia in plain
view. 5 Two agents remained in the apartment awaiting the
search warrant.2 46
The search warrant was not issued until nineteen hours af-
ter the entry.2 47 At that time the agents conducted a full scale
search of the apartment and discovered various illegal drugs and
records of narcotic transactions.2 4 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court holding that the evi-
dence discovered in plain view on the initial entry must be sup-
pressed since it was the direct product of the illegal entry into
the apartment.2 49 The court also held that the evidence seized as
a result of the full scale search pursuant to the search warrant
was admissible at trial since it had an independent source.2 5
The government did not appeal the suppression of the evidence
discovered upon the illegal entry, 5' thus, the only question
before the Supreme Court was "whether drugs and the other
items observed during the initial entry and first discovered by
the agents the day after the entry, under an admittedly valid
search warrant, should have been suppressed. '2 2
Chief Justice Burger, in his opinion for the Court, reviewed
the development of the exclusionary rule, especially in light of
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 801.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Segura v. United States, 697 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1982).
250. Id.
251. Segura, 468 U.S. at 802 n.4.
252. Id. at 804.
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United States v. Calandra,'5" and noted that the rule is a judi-
cially prescribed remedial measure and as "with any remedial
device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those
areas where its remedial objectives are thought most effica-
ciously served. 21 5 4 Burger reviewed the independent source doc-
trine as enunciated in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,255 Nardone v. United States,2 56 and Wong Sun v. United
States,257 and asserted, "[fun short, it is clear from our prior
holdings that 'the exclusionary rule has no application [where]
the Government learned of the evidence from an independent
source.' "258
The Court analyzed petitioners' claim that the primary evi-
dence should be excluded as a "fruit" derived from the illegal
entry and found that the illegal entry into petitioners' apart-
ment "did not contribute in any way to discovery of the evi-
dence seized under the warrant. '' 25 Burger concluded "that not
even the threshold 'but for' requirement was met in this case. 2 60
The primary basis for the Court's conclusion was that the
search warrant application had been started before the illegal
entry and search. In addition, the Court reasoned that the origi-
nal securing of the apartment did not result in an illegal seizure
of all contents of the apartment.2 1 Thus, items seized pursuant
to the warrant-authorized search were seized for the first time
by a process that was found not to have a "but for" connection
to the illegal search.
The Court also dispensed with petitioners' argument that
the initial entry was the "but for" cause of the ultimate discov-
ery of the evidence. Petitioners reasoned that "but for" the en-
try, the individuals present in the apartment could have re-
moved and destroyed the evidence before the warrant was
issued. The Court declined this analysis of the "but for" test be-
253. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
254. Id. at 348.
255. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
256. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
257. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
258. Segura, 468 U.S. at 805 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487).
259. Id. at 815.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 805-06.
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cause it would "extend the exclusionary rule, which already ex-
acts an enormous price from society and our system of justice, to
further 'protect' criminal activity ....
In summary, Segura held that the search warrant provided
the independent source for the discovery and seizure of the evi-
dence not seen in the original search. This search warrant was
independent" 8 since it was obtained through information suffi-
cient to support a probable cause finding known prior to the en-
try into the apartment. This was factually documented by the
agents' initiation of the process of obtaining the warrant prior to
the arrest of Segura.24
b. The Application of Inevitable Discovery in United
States v. Silvestri
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States
v. Silvestri265 found that evidence illegally discovered as a result
of a warrantless entry and search of a house and garage would
be reviewed in terms of the admissiblity of the evidence through
the inevitable discovery exception.2 66 Silvestri involved an entry
by the New Hampshire State Police into both a single family
dwelling and a garage apartment in a separate structure on the
property.267 Entry was made after 3:00 a.m. with the purpose of
securing the property pending the arrival of a search warrant.268
The original warrantless entry was found by the district court to
be "illegal and inexcusable."' 26' The circuit court, in analyzing
the difference between independent source and inevitable dis-
covery, posed the question: "which is the proper analysis to ap-
ply when evidence is discovered as the result of either an illegal
entry or search of premises for which a legal search warrant
262. Id. at 816.
263. Id. at 814.
264. Id. at 800. See Recent Developments, The Securing of the Premises Exception:
A Search for the Proper Balance, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1589 (1985) for an extensive review
and criticism of Segura.
265. 787 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1986).
266. Id. at 738.
267. Id. at 737.
268. Id.
269. United States v. Curry, 751 F.2d 442, 447 (1st Cir. 1984).
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eventually issues? 2 °70 The circuit court found that the answer
will depend on "whether the evidence first observed illegally can
be considered to be cleanly 'rediscovered' when the warrant is
executed. '271 The question was then posed: "whether objects
seen as the result of either an illegal security sweep or search
should be considered illegally seized before the warrant is exe-
cuted. '272 The circuit court concluded that because the police
did not relinquish control over the premises and the evidence
they observed the "independent source exception cannot be ap-
plied because the independent source does not result in a legal
seizure. ' 273
Having rejected the independent source exception as inap-
plicable when the illegal search precedes the process of obtaining
a search warrant, the court addressed defendant's claim "that
Nix holds that the inevitable discovery exception applies only
where the legal process for discovering the evidence has already
been set in motion at the time of the illegal discovery. 2 74 In
assessing this claim, the First Circuit reviewed the other circuit
court opinions as to whether inevitable discovery requires that
the legal discovery process be set in motion prior to illegal
discovery.
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Cherry2 75 concluded
that in order for the inevitable discovery exception to apply, the
legal process of discovery must be ongoing at the time of the
illegal discovery.2 76 In order to establish this, the prosecution
must demonstrate:
(1) a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would
have been discovered by lawful means but for the police miscon-
duct, (2) that the leads making the discovery inevitable were pos-
sessed by the police at the time of the misconduct, and (3) that
the police also prior to the misconduct were actively pursuing the
alternate line of investigation.27
270. Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 739.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 740.
274. Id. at 742.
275. 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985).
276. Id. at 1204.
277. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit adopted nearly the same rule in United
States v. Satterfield27 8 The Satterfield court found that evi-
dence discovered through an illegal warrantless search was not
admissible, even though the evidence was later seized pursuant
to a search warrant, because at the time of the illegal search the
government did not possess a search warrant nor were they in
the process of obtaining one .27 9 The Satterfield court noted that
"a valid search warrant nearly always can be obtained after the
search has occurred."280 The Tenth Circuit in United States v.
Owens 281 also limited the inevitable discovery exception to cases
where officials were already pursuing an independent line of in-
vestigation at the time of the constitutional violation.8 2
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Merri-
weather2s3 applied the inevitable discovery exception without
the requirement that the process for requesting the search war-
rant be already undertaken prior to the constitutional violation.
The court in Merriweather found that the discovery was inevita-
ble because the agents who legally searched the hotel room were
not aware of the existence of the evidence. 284 The logic of Merri-
weather2 18 was based on the Nix reasoning that there would be
no deterrence value in suppressing the evidence discovered prior
to the warrant.86 Similarly, in 1980, the Fifth Circuit allowed
admission of evidence discovered during an illegal entry, even
though the search warrant process had not been initiated, on the
grounds that the evidence inevitably would have been
discovered. 8 7
The First Circuit in Silvestri concluded that its review of
the circuits reveals:
278. 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985).
279. Id. at 846.
280. Id.
281. 782 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1986).
282. Id. at 152-53.
283. 777 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1985) The court admitted evidence initially discovered in
a warrantless search of defendant's hotel room based on the inevitable discovery excep-
tion. The evidence was later seized pursuant to a search warrant. Id.
284. Id. at 506.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. United States v. Fitzharris, 633 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
988 (1981).
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that there are three basic concerns which surface in an inevitable
discovery analysis: are the legal means truly independent; are
both the use of the legal means and the discovery by that means
truly inevitable; and does application of the inevitable discovery
exception either provide an incentive for police misconduct or sig-
nificantly weaken fourth amendment protection?288
The court recognized that in cases where the search occurs
before the warrant has been obtained, the principle concern is
"whether the later warrant is truly inevitable and independent
of the police misconduct. '289 It also expressed concern over the
"spectre of random or not so random searches" which would re-
duce the protection provided by the fourth amendment require-
ment that a warrant be obtained before a search occurs.29 °
The First Circuit, in applying these guidelines to Silvestri,
found that even though the search warrant process had not been
started, the "decision to seek a search warrant had been made
which was in no way influenced or accelerated by Sergeant Du-
Bois' discovery of the drugs."'2 91 The court concluded that "in
this case there is no necessary requirement that the warrant ap-
plication process have already been initiated at the time the ille-
gal search took place. 2 92 The court was confident "that a search
warrant for the garage would have inevitably been sought and
issued even if the illegal search had never taken place. ' 293 Thus,
the court affirmed the district court's decision to admit the
drugs as evidence pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception
to the exclusionary rule.
III. Murray v. United States
A. Facts of Arrest of Petitioners and Seizure of Evidence
1. FBI and DEA Surveillance Activity
Beginning in April of 1982, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) began sur-
288. Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 744.
289. Id. at 745.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 746.
293. Id.
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veillance activities that focused on several individuals suspected
of large-scale illegal drug activity, including petitioners Michael
Murray and James Carter.2 9 Through informants, the agents
had learned of the existence of a warehouse located in South
Boston which was allegedly used in connection with this illegal
drug activity. 295 Extensive surveillance activity, including the
tailing of suspects, led agents to follow petitioners Murray and
Carter on April 6, 1983 to a warehouse located at 345 D Street in
South Boston.2 96
Agents observed a white truck driven by Murray and a
green Dodge camper driven by Carter proceed into the ware-
house at 1:45 p.m. 297 At 2:05 p.m., both vehicles departed the
warehouse.2 98 Agents who were conducting the surveillance ob-
served two men who remained inside the warehouse after the
vehicles departed. 299 Before the overhead doors were closed, the
agents also saw a tractor trailer rig in the warehouse.300 Most of
the agents0 1 continued following both vehicles as they entered a
parking lot in South Boston. 2 The truck driven by Murray was
then turned over to accomplice Rooney who drove it away.303
Co-defendant Christopher Moscatiello entered the Dodge
camper, which had been driven by Carter, and exited the park-
ing lot.304 Agents followed both vehicles, and at 2:25 p.m., the
Dodge camper driven by co-defendant Moscatiello was stopped
by agents at a toll plaza on the Massachusetts Turnpike. 5 The
agent who pulled the camper to the side of the road noticed a
burlap covered bale of marijuana in the camper compartment of
294. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 15-18 (affidavit of DEA Agent Keaney at-
tached to search warrant).
295. Id. at 17.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 30-31 (report of investigation).
298. Id. at 31.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. DEA Agent Sampson remained at warehouse keeping it under surveillance. Id.
at 82 (pretrial transcript). Testimony of FBI Agent Cleary indicates that the warehouse
was under constant surveillance beginning at 2:00 p.m. Id. at 49 (pretrial transcript).
302. Id. at 31 (report of investigation).
303. Id. at 31-32.
304. Id. at 32.
305. Id. at 33. Agents stopped both Moscatiello and a co-defendant who was in a
jeep. Both Moscatiello and the co-defendant were driving in tandem.
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the vehicle and placed Moscatiello under arrest.30 6
At 2:30 p.m., co-defendant Rooney was arrested as he pro-
ceeded to back the truck into a driveway at a private home in
Dorchester, Massachusetts.107 At the time Mr. Rooney was
stopped, one of the agents detected the odor of marijuana com-
ing from the truck, and upon searching the truck, found sixty
bales of marijuana.30 8
After the agents, who were maintaining surveillance on peti-
tioners Murray and Carter, were informed that both the truck
and camper had been stopped and had been found to contain
bales of marijuana, they arrested petitioners.30 9 Several agents,
including Supervising Agent Ronald Garibotto, departed from
the group that had arrested Murray and Carter and returned to
the warehouse. 10
2. Search of the Warehouse
At 2:40 p.m., several agents converged on the warehouse
where the truck and camper had apparently been loaded. DEA
Supervisor Garibotto was in charge of this contingent.-" Agents
knocked on the doors and announced their presence several
times. 2  No one replied to their request for admission. 313 The
306. Id. DEA agents also had mistakenly stopped and arrested an innocent driver of
an identical vehicle which indicates some apparent confusion regarding who was follow-
ing which vehicle. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Murray v. United States, 108 S.
Ct. 2529 (1988) (No. 86-995).
307. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 33 (report of investigation).
308. Id. at 34.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 56 (pretrial transcript). The agents upon returning to the scene noticed a
man with work gloves in the back of his pockets standing in front of the warehouse. The
man appeared agitated. Id. at 35 (report of investigation). The agent who was conducting
the surveillance from his car while driving around the block where the warehouse was
located did not see the individual on the next trip around the block. Id. The implication
in the report of investigation was that this individual may have entered the warehouse.
Yet, the testimony of DEA Agent Sampson and FBI Agent Cleary who both had the
warehouse under surveillance during this period does not give any indication that this
individual entered the warehouse. Id. at 49, 83 (pretrial transcript: testimony of Agents
Cleary and Sampson).
311. Id. at 72 (pretrial transcript). Agent Garibotto was the group supervisor over
Agent Keaney who was the case agent in charge of the investigation. Id. at 60.
312. Id. at 75 (pretrial transcript).
313. Brief for the United States at 5, Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529
(1988) (Nos. 86-995 & 86-1016).
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agents who had lifted the mail slot on the building to announce
their presence noticed the smell of a strong unidentified odor
from within the warehouse. 1 Supervisor Garibotto, having al-
ready decided at 2:30 p.m. to enter the warehouse, obtained a
tire iron from his car to force open the door.3 1' The testimony of
FBI Special Agent Cleary, who was on the scene, indicated that
Garibotto's decision to enter the warehouse was one that was not
discussed.3 16 Presumably, the agents saw Garibotto proceed to
his car, open the trunk and take out the tire iron - the pur-
pose of which was unmistakably clear.3 1 7 That purpose was to
forcibly enter the warehouse.
Garibotto indicated that he decided to enter the warehouse
in order to prevent the destruction of written documents that
might indicate the supply and distribution network of the mari-
juana .31 Ten of the approximately sixteen FBI and DEA agents
assigned to the case entered the warehouse with guns drawn s19
and remained inside the warehouse for approximately five min-
utes. 2 0 The agents searched the warehouse for people; none
were found.32 1 During this search the agents found, in plain
view, numerous bales which they suspected contained mari-
juana.3s2 At the end of this period, supervisor Garibotto ordered
everyone to leave the warehouse and to secure it from the
314. Id.
315. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 75 (pretrial transcript).
316. Id. at 52 (pretrial transcript). There is clear indication throughout the pretrial
transcript that Garibotto's decision was one made with time for reflection and was not
one made in the midst of a crisis. In fact, given the decision to stop the vehicles which
had departed the warehouse, it could have been anticipated that the agents would desire
to search the warehouse. In addition, the testimony of DEA Agent Keaney indicated that
Garibotto did not consult with DEA Agent Keaney, the case agent in charge of the inves-
tigation, who was present at the arrest of Murray and Carter when Garibotto proceeded
to the warehouse. Id. at 68 (pretrial transcript).
317. Id. at 75. Yet the testimony of FBI Special Agent Cleary was that he was taken
by surprise by Garibotto's action to break into the warehouse. Id. at 68.
318. Id. at 78 (pretrial transcript).
319. Id. at 57.
320. The issue of the length of time that the agents remained in the warehouse was
in dispute at trial. Petitioner maintained that the agents were actually in the warehouse
for over 15 minutes. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529
(1988) (Nos. 86-995 & 86-1016).
321. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 58.
322. Id. at 68.
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outside. 2
3. Request for Search Warrant and Second Search of
Warehouse
After this search a decision was made to obtain a search
warrant for the warehouse, the garage in Dorchester where
Rooney was arrested, and the green Dodge camper. 24 According
to Agent Keaney, a conscious decision was made at the time the
affidavit for the warrant was prepared to exclude reference to
the warrantless entry into the warehouse.32 5 On April 6th at
10:35 p.m., a warrant authorizing a search of the warehouse was
issued by U.S. Magistrate Joyce Alexander.3 2 It was immedi-
ately executed and resulted in the seizure of approximately 270
bales of marijuana weighing 18,022.9 pounds.32
B. Procedural History
1. Arraignment and Suppression Hearing
Following their arrest on April 6, 1983, the petitioners were
arraigned and later indicted on April 20, 1983 for the crimes of
possession of more than 1,000 pounds of marijuana with intent
to distribute and conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(A)(1), 841(B)(6) and 846.328 Petitioners sought to suppress
the evidence seized at the warehouse as "fruits" of the illegal
323. Id. at 77.
324. Id. at 52 (pretrial transcript). The testimony of FBI Agent Cleary indicates
that to his knowledge there were no discussions of obtaining a search warrant prior to
the entry. Id.
325. Id. at 70 (pretrial transcript: testimony of DEA Agent Keaney at suppression
hearing).
Q. I just asked you, did you decide intentionally not to include in the affidavit
that you and other agents had already been inside the warehouse?
Mr. Crossen: I object, your Honor. I believe he answered that question.
The Court: Well, I suppose it can be derived but just a plain yes or no.
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. Yes is your answer?
A. That's correct.
Id.
326. Id. at 11-12 (search warrant).
327. Id. at 25 (search warrant return).
328. Id. at 39-42 (superseding indictment).
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search.32 9 The issue presented in federal court at the pretrial
suppression hearing was whether the evidence in the warehouse
was inadmissible due to the prior warrantless entry into the
warehouse.330
In reviewing whether the officers were justified in initially
arresting the defendants, as well as searching the white truck
and seizing the green Dodge camper, Judge Skinner found that
there were sufficient facts of a collective nature to justify such
arrests, seizures and searches. 3 ' Having found that the search of
the white panel truck was pursuant to the standards established
in United States v. Ross,332 the court asserted that: "It follows
that the same facts, with the addition of the results of the search
of the white Ford truck and the observation of marijuana in the
green Dodge camper, furnished probable cause for the issuance
of search warrants." ' Thus, having found that probable cause
existed independent of the illegal entry, the court denied peti-
tioners' request for suppression of the evidence because "none of
. . . the arrests, searches or seizures violate[d] the Fourth
Amendment. '"3 ' District Judge Skinner also ruled that: "None
of the defendants have standing to challenge the search of the
warehouse, which was owned by a corporation in the absence of
any evidence that any portion of the warehouse was set aside for
the personal use of any defendant as corporate officer, employee
or financial backer. 33 5
In summary, the district court findings on the suppression
329. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 33a, Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct.
2529 (1988) (Nos. 86-995 & 86-1016) (memorandum and order on various motions of the
defendants to suppress and to dismiss). The defendants at trial also sought suppression
of the evidence from the searches of the vehicles and the garage at Dorchester. Id.
330. Id. at 32a. Petitioners at the suppression hearing also asserted that the agents'
failure to reveal in their search warrant affidavit the prior illegal entry of the warehouse
should be viewed as false statements made with the intent to deceive the magistrate. Id.
at 45a. District Court Judge Skinner found that "the courts have uniformly held that an
omission of facts from an affidavit without warrant does not constitute a false statement
made with intent to deceive within the meaning of Franks v. Delaware." Id. See supra
notes 97-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of Franks.
331. Id. at 46a.
332. Id. at 44a (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)). See supra notes
102-08 and accompanying text.
333. Id. at 46a.
334. Id. at 47a.
335. Id. at 48a.
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of evidence were that: one, none of the seizures violated the
fourth amendment, as the seizures were either pursuant to the
automobile exception under Ross, or pursuant to the search war-
rant issued which was based entirely on the probable cause that
existed prior to the illegal entry; and two, none of the defend-
ants had standing to challenge the search of the warehouse.
3 6
2. Federal District Court Trial
Having denied petitioners' suppression motion, the trial of
Murray, Carter and the other co-defendants337 commenced on
January 23, 1984. On January 27th, a jury verdict of guilty was
entered.3 38 Petitioners Murray and Carter, though acquitted on
two counts, were each convicted on one count of conspiracy,
were sentenced to four years imprisonment and were fined$15,000. 339
3. First Court of Appeals Decision
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's conviction in an opinion written by Chief Judge
Campbell on August 26, 1985.340 Two issues were raised in this
appeal: One, that the appellants had been denied their rights to
a speedy trial;3 ' 1 and two, that their fourth amendment rights
had been violated in the searches of vehicles and various build-
ings. 2 On the issue of petitioners' standing to object to the ad-
336. Id. at 47a-48a.
337. John Rooney and Christopher Moscatiello were co-defendants. They both en-
tered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession. United States v. Mosca-
tiello, 771 F.2d 589, 591 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted and remanded sub nom. Murray v.
United States, 476 U.S. 1138, affd on remand sub nom. United States v. Carter, 803
F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded sub nom. Murray v. United States, 108 S.
Ct. 2529 (1988).
338. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 591-92.
339. The trial court had previously dismissed two counts against Murray at the
close of the government's case. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3-4, Murray v. United
States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988) (Nos. 86-995 & 86-1016).
340. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589.
341. Id. at 591-92. The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) provides that the
trial of defendants who plead not guilty shall commence within 70 days of their indict-
ment. The act excludes from the computation of the seventy-day period delays resulting
from any pretrial motion.
342. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 591-92.
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mission of evidence obtained from the warehouse, both Murray
and Carter argued that they had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the warehouse and therefore, the trial court had erred in
holding that they lacked standing to contest the legality of the
searches.343 The court noted that Murray and Carter "further
assert[ed] that the search warrant for the warehouse was tainted
by the agents' failure to mention the earlier warrantless search
of the warehouse, requiring the suppression of all evidence
seized at the warehouse .. . . ,44 Petitioners also argued in the
alternative that even if the search warrant were found not to be
tainted, all of the evidence discovered in plain view during the
initial unauthorized entry should be suppressed as the direct
product of the fourth amendment violation.34 5
a. Petitioners Found to Have Standing to Raise Fourth
Amendment Issue
On the issue of whether Murray and Carter had standing to
assert that their fourth amendment rights had been violated by
the illegal search of the warehouse, the First Circuit found that
"the court erred in ruling that '[n]one of the defendants have
standing to challenge the search of the warehouse, which was
owned by a corporation .... "3I4 Its analysis of the lower court's
reasoning was that the trial court viewed fourth amendment
protection as requiring personal ownership of the warehouse or
personal use of some portion of the warehouse.34 7 The court
found that "there was ample evidence to indicate that Murray
and Carter had 'a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
searched,' ",348 and, therefore, held that Carter and Murray had
standing to contest the search of the warehouse. 49
343. Id. at 601.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. (citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980)). This would appear
to be consistent with See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), see supra notes 86-89
and accompanying text.
349. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 601.
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b. Review of Exigent Circumstances
The circuit court also reviewed the issue of whether exigent
circumstances existed to justify the warrantless search of the
warehouse.3 50 The court disposed of this issue by concluding
that the issue of exigent circumstances was not raised at the
trial level and that they were therefore "loath to conclude that
exigent circumstances [exist] as now argued."3 5 The court noted
that "[w]e accordingly do not reach the government's claim of
exigency but turn directly, as did the district court, to the ques-
tion of whether or not to suppress the evidence found in the
warehouse on the assumption, arguendo, that the warrantless
entry was in violation of the fourth amendment. '352
c. Independent Source Doctrine Applied; Conviction
Affirmed
The circuit court, for the first time, raised the issue of
whether the evidence was obtained through an independent law-
ful source, citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States 5
The court of appeals concurred with the district court that the
warrant was not tainted by the omission of any reference to the
illegal entry and asserted that "the mere omission of irrelevant
350. Id. at 601-02.
351. Id. at 602. The record clearly indicates, however, that this issue was directly
raised by the prosecution at the suppression hearing. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 48
(pretrial transcript). In the opening statement by Mr. Crossen for the prosecution, he
stated "the agents will also tell you there was an exigent circumstance took [sic] place..
. .The agents, again, will testify to the reason behind the exigent circumstances entry.
To secure the premises to determine whether or not confederates were inside .... Id.
As this issue was not decided at the federal court trial, this Note will assume for the
purpose of analyzing the development of independent source doctrine that exigent cir-
cumstances did not exist. Obviously, if exigent circumstances existed, then the warrant-
less search would be justified and consistent with traditional interpretations of the pro-
tection provided by the fourth amendment. The critical point is that all courts reviewing
Murray have proceeded from the position that exigent circumstances did not exist and,
therefore, justified the admission of the evidence based on the independent source doc-
trine. See United States v. Gallo, 859 F.2d 1078, 1084 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1513 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 707 F.
Supp. 1207 (D. Haw. 1989).
352. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 602.
353. 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The circuit court stated that "evidence obtained
through an independent, lawful source need not be suppressed even if the police were
also led to it through means that violated the fourth amendment .... Moscatiello, 771
F.2d at 602.
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facts from an affidavit constitutes no reason to suppress the war-
rant." 354 The court further found that the omission neither en-
hanced the contents of the affidavit nor deceived the magistrate
into granting a warrant he would otherwise not have issued.3 55
Moving on to the more difficult question, the court analyzed
whether a reading of Segura v. United States356 would require
suppression of the evidence found in plain view during the ille-
gal entry. The circuit court concluded this analysis by citing
Segura and Nix v. Williams3 5 as support for the conclusion that
the evidence seen in plain view during the initial warrantless
search should not be suppressed.35 8
This is as clear a case as can be imagined where the discovery of
the contraband in plain view was totally irrelevant to the later
securing of a warrant and the successful search that ensued. As
there was no causal link whatever between the illegal entry and
the discovery of the challenged evidence, we find no error in the
court's refusal to suppress. 59
A rehearing on this appeal was denied on October 31, 1985.60
4. The First Supreme Court Appeal, Subsequent Remand
to the First Circuit, and Second Supreme Court Appeal
James Carter, Michael Murray, and John Rooney appealed
the First Circuit decision to the Supreme Court which granted
certiorari 361 and vacated the judgment of the lower court. The
case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
for further consideration in light of Henderson v. United
States.2 The First Circuit on remand reviewed the case in light
of Henderson and affirmed the defendants' convictions.36 3 On
354. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 603 (emphasis added).
355. Id. (citing United States v. Strini, 658 F.2d 593, 597 (8th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1389 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981)).
356. 468 U.S. 796 (1984). See supra notes 238-64 and accompanying text.
357. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
358. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 604.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 589.
361. Carter v. United States, Murray v. United States, and Rooney v. United States,
476 U.S. 1138 (1986).
362. 476 U.S. 321 (1986) (Henderson provided guidance as to interpreting the
Speedy Trial Act's handling of time periods during pretrial motions.).
363. United States v. Carter, 803 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1986). The decision by Chief
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December 17, 1986, petitioners filed for a second writ of certio-
rari with the Supreme Court. 64 The Court, in granting certio-
rari,365 limited arguments to the fourth amendment issue. On
June 28, 1988, on the second to last day of the 1987-1988 term,
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for the Court.6 6 Justice
Marshall dissented.36 7
C. Opinion of the Court
Justice Scalia opened the majority opinion in Murray v.
United States with a recitation of the holding of Segura v.
United States3 and proposed that the question presented in
Murray is "whether, again assuming evidence obtained pursuant
to an independently obtained search warrant, the portion of
such evidence that had been observed in plain view at the time
of a prior illegal entry must be suppressed." 36 9 Thus, Scalia sug-
gests that Murray will finally answer the unanswered question
in Segura.37 0 After a brief statement of the facts of the case, Jus-
Judge Campbell focused only on the Speedy Trial Act issue as Henderson v. United
States provided guidelines on the handling of pretrial motions under the Speedy Trial
Act. Id. Neither the Supreme Court in its 1986 decision to grant certiorari and remand
nor the First Circuit in its affirmation of the petitioners' conviction addressed the fourth
amendment claim of petitioners.
364. Murray v. United States 803 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 56
USLW 3026 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1986) (No. 86-995).
365. 480 U.S. 916 (1987).
366. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988). Justice Scalia's opinion was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Blackmun.
367. Id. at 2536 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's dissent was joined by
Justices Stevens and O'Connor. A separate dissent was also filed by Justice Stevens. Id.
at 2540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
368. 468 U.S. 796 (1984). "[W]e held that police officers' illegal entry upon private
premises did not require suppression of evidence subsequently discovered at those prem-
ises when executing a search warrant obtained on the basis of information wholly uncon-
nected with the initial entry." Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
369. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
370. Segura, 468 U.S. at 802 n.4. Chief Justice Burger noted that:
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the initial entry into
the apartment was not justified by exigent circumstances, and thus that the items
discovered in plain view during the limited security check had to be suppressed to
effect the purposes of the Fourth Amendment .... Because the Government has
decided not to press its argument that exigent circumstances existed, we need not
and do not address this aspect of the Court of Appeals decision. We are concerned
only with whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that the Fourth
Amendment did not require suppression of the evidence seized during execution
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/5
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tice Scalia, in Part II of the opinion, proceeded to state the func-
tion of the exclusionary rule in reference to prohibiting the in-
troduction of products of an unlawful search into evidence.37 1
Scalia classified the types of evidence to be excluded as being
tangible material seized,3 72 knowledge acquired during the
search,373 and derivative evidence of both tangible and testimo-
nial nature that is the indirect result of the unlawful search.7 4
Scalia cited Nardone v. United States87 5 as supportive of the
proposition that derivative evidence is subject to the exclusion-
ary rule up to the point at which the connection between the
acquisition of the evidence and the unlawful search becomes
" 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' ")376
Justice Scalia next analyzed the independent source doc-
trine and commented that cases before the Supreme Court
"have used the concept of 'independent source' in a more gen-
eral and a more specific sense. The more general sense identifies
all evidence acquired in a fashion untainted by the illegal evi-
dence-gathering activity. 3 7 7 He further explained that where
knowledge of facts X and Y are obtained through an unlawful
entry, fact Z, learned of by other legal means, is admissible be-
cause it is from an independent source. 78 One example given by
Justice Scalia of independent source in this more general sense
is where evidence found for the first time during the execution
of the valid untainted search warrant was admissible because it
was discovered pursuant to an "independent source. ''3 This ev-
idence in Segura was not the evidence found during the unlaw-
ful entry, but was evidence subsequently learned by other legal
of the valid warrant.
Id.
371. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
372. Id. (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
373. Id. (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).
374. Id. at 2533 (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
375. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
376. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2533 (citation omitted).
377. Id.
378. Id. The point that Justice Scalia was making with his use of X, Y, and Z facts
is that in the general sense not only is the source independent but also the knowledge
itself (or the evidence) is different and not derivative of knowledge gained through an
unlawful entry.
379. Id. (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813-14 (1984)).
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means.38 0
The Murray case presented an example of independent
source used in its more specific sense; that is, the evidence ac-
quired by the untainted search warrant was identical to the evi-
dence unlawfully acquired during the illegal search."' Continu-
ing his earlier analogy, Justice Scalia described this use of
independent source doctrine: where facts "X" and "Y" are ob-
tained through an unlawful entry, but where the same facts "X"
and "Y" are obtained pursuant to legal means, knowledge of
facts "X" and "Y" are considered derived from an independent
source."8 2 Having provided this brief overview of the indepen-
dent source doctrine, Scalia proceeded to review the concept of
the doctrine through its application in the inevitable discovery
doctrine context.
This "inevitable discovery" doctrine obviously assumes the valid-
ity of the independent source doctrine as applied to evidence ini-
tially acquired unlawfully. It would make no sense to admit the
evidence because the independent search, had it not been
aborted, would have found the body, but to exclude the evidence
if the search had continued and had in fact found the body. 83
Scalia next addressed the critical question presented in
Murray: whether the finding of the applicability of the indepen-
dent source doctrine to cases where the police unlawfully search
and subsequently seek a legal search warrant would lead to the
encouragement of unlawful police activity. 84 The petitioners, in
their brief,385 and Justice Marshall, in his dissent,8" raised the
380. Also cited by Justice Scalia as examples of this sense of independent source
were the following cases: United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240-42 (1967); Costello v.
United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 (1961); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939). Id.
381. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2533.
382. Id. Justice Scalia, in connection with this explanation of independent source
doctrine, cited Justice Holmes' comments from Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), "if knowledge of them is gained from an independent source
they may be proved like others." Id. at 392.
383. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2534.
384. Id.
385. Brief for Petitioners at 42, Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988)
(Nos. 86-995 & 86-1016). The petitioners argued:
Officers will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by searching illegally first
and then seeking a warrant. As we have discussed, if their initial illegal entry
turns up nothing, they will have saved themselves the time and trouble of prepar-
[Vol. 10:167
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concern that law enforcement officers would routinely search
without a search warrant in order to ensure that the evidence
they had probable cause to believe to be present on the premises
was in fact present prior to the time-consuming process of re-
questing a warrant. If the evidence was not present, then search-
ing unlawfully before going through the process of requesting a
search warrant would spare the officers considerable time. 8 7 If
the evidence is present, the officers can obtain the warrant de-
spite the unlawful entry provided they do not utilize any infor-
mation learned as a result of the unlawful entry.3 88 Justice Scalia
replied:
We see the incentives differently. An officer with probable cause
sufficient to obtain a search warrant would be foolish to enter the
premises first in an unlawful manner. By doing so, he would risk
suppression of all evidence on the premises, both seen and un-
seen, since his action would add to the normal burden of convinc-
ing a magistrate that there is probable cause the much more oner-
ous burden of convincing a trial court that no information gained
from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officer's
decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant
it.389
In Part III of the opinion Justice Scalia applied his preced-
ing comments on the independent source doctrine to Murray.
Scalia noted that the agents acquired the knowledge that the
marijuana was in the warehouse both at the time of the unlawful
entry and also at the time of the entry pursuant to the search
warrant. "[I]f that later acquisition was not the result of the ear-
lier entry there is no reason why the independent source doc-
trine should not apply."390 Scalia rejected the differentiation be-
ing an affidavit and presenting it to the magistrate. On the other hand, if they do
find something but the magistrate determines that probable cause is lacking, the
officers will have lost nothing because they would not have been able to enter
legally anyway.
Id. at 42 n.40.
386. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2538 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
387. Id.
388. Id. Justice Marshall noted in dissent that "[t]he police thus know in advance
that they have little to lose and much to gain by foregoing the bother of obtaining a
warrant and undertaking an illegal search." Id.
389. Id. at 2534.
390. Id. at 2535.
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tween tangible and intangible evidences" proposed by the First
Circuit in United States v. Silvestri.3 92 In Silvestri, the First
Circuit found that in cases where warrantless illegal searches are
followed by warrant-authorized searches, the physical objects
once seized can not be easily reseized 3" Since the evidence in
Silvestri had been illegally seized, the First Circuit reasoned
that in order to find grounds for admission of the evidence, the
inevitable discovery exception would have to apply. Scalia de-
parted from the First Circuit's reasoning in Silvestri by assert-
ing that the knowledge of illegal drugs was acquired both during
the illegal entry and during the warrant-authorized search,"'4
and thus, the independent source doctrine could be utilized.3 95
Having determined that the independent source doctrine
can be applied to the present matter, Scalia then raised the final
question: whether the search pursuant to the warrant was, in
fact, a genuinely independent source of the information.39 6
Scalia rejected the findings of the court of appeals3 97 on this
391. Tangible evidence is the physical evidence itself (e.g., the illegal drugs); intan-
gible evidence is the knowledge of some fact which was received through the senses
where the thing perceived is not a physical object (e.g., verbal confession). BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 498-99 (5th ed. 1979).
392. 787 F.2d 736, 739 (1st Cir. 1986). See supra notes 265-93 and accompanying
text. Justice Scalia asserted that:
[R]eseizure of tangible evidence already seized is no more impossible than redis-
covery of intangible evidence already discovered. The independent source doctrine
does not rest upon such metaphysical analysis, but upon the policy that, while the
government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed
in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied. So long as a later,
lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one (which may well
be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police's possession)
there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply.
Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2535.
393. Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 739.
394. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2535.
395. Id. at 2533. Justice Scalia noted that "[tihe original use of the term, however,
and its more important use for purposes of this case, was more specific." Id. (emphasis
added). In addition, Justice Scalia maintained that "[tihe ultimate question, therefore, is
whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of
the information and tangible evidence at issue here." Id. at 2535. Though Justice Scalia
indicated that classical independent source doctrine is employed in Murray, many of his
citations for support are to Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the case which estab-
lished the inevitable discovery exception. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2533-35.
396. Murray 108 S. Ct. at 2535.
397. The court of appeals found that "[tihis is as clear a case as can be imagined
where the discovery of the contraband in plain view was totally irrelevant to the later
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point, since this issue was not addressed by the district court
and because it "is the function of the District Court rather than
the Court of Appeals to determine the facts . . ,.". Conse-
quently, the Court vacated the judgments and remanded the
cases to the court of appeals with instructions that it remand to
the district court "for determination whether the warrant-au-
thorized search of the warehouse was an independent source of
the challenged evidence in the sense we have described. 'ss
D. Justice Marshall's Dissent
Justice Marshall dissented to the Court's opinion 00 finding
that "the Court's decision, by failing to provide sufficient guar-
antees that the subsequent search was, in fact, independent of
the illegal search, emasculates the Warrant Clause and under-
mines the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule. '40 1 To
Justice Marshall, the independent source exception is primarily
based on a practical view that "under certain circumstances the
beneficial deterrent effect that exclusion will have on future con-
stitutional violations is too slight to justify the social cost of ex-
cluding probative evidence from a criminal trial. '40 2
The first footnote in Marshall's dissent provided a clear,
concise example of the application of the independent source ex-
ception: "when a wholly separate line of investigation, shielded
from information gathered in an illegal search, turns up the
same evidence through a separate, lawful search. ' 403 Marshall
noted that the exclusion of such evidence would not be a deter-
rent to law enforcement officers because they would have little
reason to anticipate separate investigations leading to the same
evidence.04
securing of a warrant and the successful search that ensued." United States v. Mosca-
tiello, 771 F.2d 589, 604 (1st Cir. 1985).
398. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2536.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 2529, 2536-40 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's dissent
was joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor.
401. Id. at 2536.
402. Id. at 2537.
403. Id. at 2537 n.1. In note 3, Justice Marshall compared Murray to Nix in terms
of whether the investigation in Murray was wholly separate; he found that there were
significant differences. Id. at 2539 n.3.
404. Id. at 2537 n.1.
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Marshall criticized the majority opinion by indicating that
he believed that the Court has lost sight of the "practical moor-
ings ' 05 of the independent source doctrine. Marshall contended
that a review of the Murray facts clearly indicated that the FBI
and DEA agents had made no effort to obtain a warrant prior to
the initial entry and that the affidavit in support of the warrant
did not make any mention of the warrantless search of the ware-
house.40 6 Consequently, he found that the admission of the evi-
dence "reseized" pursuant to the search "undermines the deter-
rent function of the exclusionary rule. 4 07 Marshall found that
the admission of such evidence affirmatively encouraged illegal
searches because the police "have little to lose and much to gain
by foregoing the bother of obtaining a warrant and undertaking
an illegal search." 0 l8 Marshall rejected Scalia's assessment that
the police would realize that they had an additional burden of
convincing a trial court that no information gained from the ille-
gal entry affected either the decision to seek a warrant or the
magistrate's decision to grant one.409 Marshall rejected this be-
cause "it is a simple matter . . . to exclude from the warrant
application any information gained from the initial entry so that
the magistrate's determination of probable cause is not influ-
enced by the prior illegal search. '410
More critically, he asserted that "today's decision makes the
application of the independent source exception turn entirely on
an evaluation of the officers' intent. ' 411 Marshall appears to have
correctly assessed the importance of the officers' intent; espe-
cially in light of the Court's remand to the district court to de-
termine whether or not "the agents would have sought a warrant
if they had not earlier entered the warehouse."4 12 Thus, if the
officers had intended to obtain a search warrant prior to the ille-
gal entry, Scalia, and the Court, would find that the subsequent
warrant-authorized search was an independent source.
405. Id. at 2537.
406. Id. at 2538.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 2536 (emphasis added).
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Justice Marshall recognized the very practical problem with
an intent-based rule since "[t]he testimony of the officers con-
ducting the illegal search is the only direct evidence of intent,
and the defendant will be relegated simply to arguing that the
officers should not be believed. 4 13 In addition, Marshall re-
sponded to this focus on the intention of the officers as being of
dubious value for the following reasons:
First, the intent of the officers prior to the illegal entry often
will be of little significance to the relevant question: whether,
even if the initial entry uncovered no evidence, the officers' would
return immediately with a warrant to conduct a second
search . . . . In addition, such an intent rule will be difficult to
apply. The Court fails to describe how a trial court will properly
evaluate whether the law enforcement officers' fully intended to
obtain a warrant regardless of what they discovered during the
illegal search.414
Marshall expressed concern that in order to eliminate incentives
for illegal action, the Court should closely scrutinize the applica-
tion of the independent source exception and should not rely on
the intent of the law enforcement officers who conduct warrant-
less searches.415 Marshall contended that to insure that there is a
genuinely independent source, the Court should focus, as it did
in the inevitable discovery doctrine, on "demonstrated historical
facts capable of ready verification or impeachment. ' 41 Marshall
noted that in the. instant case there were no demonstrated his-
torical facts which supported the subsequent warrant search as
wholly unaffected by the prior illegal search."'
Marshall proceeded to demonstrate that the decision in
413. Id. at 2538.
414. Id. at 2538 n.2. Justice Marshall commented that "[o]fficers who have probable
cause to believe contraband is present genuinely might intend later to obtain a warrant,
but after the illegal search uncovers no such contraband, those same officers might de-
cide their time is better spent than to return with a warrant." Id.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 2539 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 n.5 (1984)). In Nix, the
demonstrated historical fact that Justice Marshall referred to was the actual indepen-
dent investigation and search by over 200 individuals in the area where the child's body
would have been found. Nix, 467 U.S. at 435. See supra notes 216-37 and accompanying
text for further discussion on Nix.
417. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2539.
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Segura v. United States'18 is consistent with his view of Murray.
He cited as authority the Chief Justice's statement that "officers
who enter illegally will recognize that whatever evidence they
discover as a direct result of the entry may be suppressed, as it
was by the Court of Appeals in this case. "419 Marshall argued
that extending the holding of Segura to cover evidence discov-
ered during an initial illegal search will eradicate this remaining
deterrent to illegal entry.420 Justice Marshall consequently dis-
sented to the Court's opinion.42 1
IV. Analysis of Murray v. United States
The application of the independent source, attenuated con-
nection, or inevitable discovery doctrines in Murray v. United
States422 reveals that the evidence in question must be sup-
pressed. This conclusion is reached through an analysis of the
various tests developed for each doctrine. This analysis will
demonstrate that the strict "but for" test does not support ad-
mission of the evidence in the situation where the police have
searched first and sought a search warrant later. In addition, the
inevitable discovery doctrine does not support the admission of
this evidence where the police have not initiated a request for a
search warrant prior to the illegal search. The application of the
attenuated connection exception to the facts presented in Mur-
ray presents a more difficult assessment in determining whether
evidence should be suppressed. A modified test articulated in
Brown v. Illinois423 will be applied in this analysis. The result of
this application is that even under the attenuated connection
doctrine, the evidence should be suppressed.
A further analysis of the three doctrines demonstrates that
though they focus on different aspects of the relationship be-
418. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
419. Id. at 812.
420. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2540.
421. Id. at 2536-40. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent in which he noted that
he remained "convinced that the Segura decision itself was unacceptable because, even
then, it was obvious that it would 'provide government agents with an affirmative incen-
tive to engage in unconstitutional violations of the privacy of the home.' " Id. (quoting
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 817 (1984)).
422. 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
423. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
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tween the illegal search and the acquisition of evidence, the
three doctrines need to be applied in the sequence starting with
independent source, followed by attenuated connection, and
concluding with inevitable discovery. Often courts proceed di-
rectly to the test that appears most relevant without a system-
atic review of all three doctrines. This was the course followed
by the Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams4' 2  and Murray v.
United States.2 5 The use of this unsystematic approach results
in the posing of irrelevant and misleading questions concerning
the acquisition of the evidence. This assessment is based on the
different purposes that the independent source, attenuated con-
nection, and inevitable discovery doctrines serve when applied
to the exclusionary rule's prohibition of use of "the fruit of the
poisonous tree. 4 2 6 In reaching the conclusion that the evidence
should be suppressed, Murray v. United States will be com-
pared with Segura v. United States.27 In addition, recent mate-
rial examining the cost of the exclusionary rule will be presented
since an incorrect assessment of this cost by the Court underlies
its conclusion.
A. Tests for the Application of the Independent Source, At-
tenuated Connection, and Inevitable Discovery Doctrines
The application of the independent source doctrine as enun-
ciated in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States4 8 is limited
to those situations where the "but for" analysis indicates that
there is no causal linkage between the illegal activity and the
acquisition of the evidence.' 2 9 Consequently, questions such as
the temporal relationship or the flagrancy of the constitutional
violation are not at issue. The issue is strictly one of reviewing
424. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
425. 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
426. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). See supra notes 193-98 and
accompanying text.
427. 468 U.S. 796 (1984), see supra notes 238-64 and accompanying text.
428. 251 U.S. 385 (1920), see supra notes 186-92 and accompanying text. See also
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
429. For example, if in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), the police had discov-
ered the child's body at the same time the discovery was made by the officers by virtue
of the tainted confession, the evidence from the body would have been admissible be-
cause the constitutional violation was not the "but for" cause of the obtaining of the
evidence.
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the causal connections and if the result of such review indicates
that the illegal action by the government is not the "but for"
cause of the acquisition of the evidence, then the evidence is
admitted.
The attenuated connection doctrine is applied when there is
a causal relationship between the illegal government action and
the acquisition of the evidence. Wong Sun v. United States
4 s0
and Brown v. Illinois481 provide significant guidance as to how
attenuated the causal relationship must be for the taint to be
dissipated. Wong Sun is an example of a causal relationship that
both is and is not sufficiently attenuated.432 Brown provides the
test to determine if the attenuation is sufficient to remove the
taint of the constitutional violation.433 The test proposed in
Brown evaluates whether the evidence "'has been come at by
the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguished to be purged of the primary taint.' -34 The factors
to be assessed are the following: one, the issuance of Miranda
warnings; two, the temporal proximity between the fourth
amendment violation and the obtaining of the evidence; three,
the presence of intervening circumstances; and four, an assess-
ment of the flagrancy of the official misconduct.
The test for the application of inevitable discovery, as
presented in Nix v. Williams,435 involves a factual showing that
the government was in the process of pursuing an independent
investigation and that the government would have found the ev-
idence through legitimate means had it not already been discov-
ered pursuant to the illegal act. As noted in Nix, "[i]f the prose-
cution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered
by lawful means - here the volunteers' search - then the de-
terrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be
received. Anything less would reject logic, experience, and com-
430. 371 U.S. 471 (1963), see supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
431. 422 U.S. 590 (1975), see supra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
432. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486 and 491.
433. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04. See supra notes 207-15 and accompanying text for
further discussion on Brown.
434. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).
435. 467 U.S. 431 (1984), see supra notes 216-37 and accompanying text.
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mon sense."' 6 Nix suggests that in order for inevitable discov-
ery to apply, the independent investigation must be underway
prior to the illegal act which results in the actual discovery of
the evidence. 37
The following matrix summarizes the factors that these
tests assess and clearly indicates that each doctrine has its dis-
tinct application depending on the circumstances.
COMPARISON OF COMMON FACTORS IN
INDEPENDENT SOURCE, ATTENUATED CONNECTION,
AND INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINES
FACTOR INDEP. ATTEN. INEVITABLE
SOURCE CONNECT. DISCOVERY
Causal connection between
violation and acquisition N Y Y
of evidence
Attenuation of connection
between violation and I Y I
acquisition of evidence
Flagrancy of constitutional
violation I N I
Close temporal relation
between violation and the I N Y
acquisition of evidence
Alternate means of discovery
of evidence was in progress I I Y
N = Must not be present in order to apply exception
Y = Must be present in order to apply exception
I = Factor irrelevant to application of doctrine
This matrix demonstrates that only the independent source
doctrine requires no casual connection between the violation and
the acquisition of the evidence. Similarly, while the attenuation
of this causal connection factor is an absolute requirement of the
attenuated connection doctrine, this factor is not a consideration
of the independent source or inevitable discovery doctrines. The
flagrancy of the constitutional violation is irrelevant to the inde-
436. Id. at 444.
437. Id.
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pendent source and inevitable discovery doctrines but is a signif-
icant factor when applying the attenuated connection doctrine.
While a causal connection between the violation and acquisition
of the evidence must be present in the inevitable discovery doc-
trine, it must be absent in the attenuated connection doctrine,
and is irrelevant in the independent source doctrine. In addition,
the fact that alternate means of discovering the evidence were in
progress is relevant only to inevitable discovery.
The different tests and applications of the independent
source, attenuated connection, and inevitable discovery doc-
trines demonstrate that although these tests have much in com-
mon, it is critical to be precise about which doctrine is being
applied when analyzing a particular fact pattern.4 38 This is sig-
nificant because the same questions require different responses
in order for each doctrine to apply in a particular situation. Al-
though each doctrine should be applied separately, there is an
interrelation among the doctrines. This interrelation indicates a
specific order of application of the doctrines to determine if evi-
dence is "fruit of the poisonous tree."
The first doctrine to be applied is the independent source
doctrine, using the "but for" test. The analysis should focus on
whether there is any causal connection between the illegal
search and the acquisition of evidence. If there is no connection,
then the evidence is admitted and the analysis stops. Logically,
it makes sense to apply this doctrine first since the question of
attenuated connection or independent discovery assumes some
connection between the two events. For example, one would not
need to assess the factors listed in the test for the attenuated
connection doctrine if the acquisition of the evidence is truly
438. It is interesting to note that both Justices Scalia and Marshall focused their
argument on whether allowing this evidence to be admitted would encourage police to
violate the Constitution. Both Justices applied the independent source doctrine in their
analysis. But consideration of whether the admission of this evidence encourages police
to violate the Constitution is not a factor in the independent source doctrine. It is a
factor to be considered only in the inevitable discovery doctrine. If the constitutional
violation is not the "but for" cause of the acquisition of the evidence, then the evidence
should be admitted. All that is required under Silverthorne is that the evidence have a
separate independent untainted source. Consequently, this focus by Justices Scalia and
Marshall on an inevitable discovery factor when the issue is application of the indepen-
dent source doctrine indicates a conceptual problem in the application of all three
doctrines.
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separate.
The second doctrine to be applied is attenuated connection,
using the test developed in Brown v. Illinois.439 Again, if the ap-
plication of this test indicates that the connection is sufficiently
attenuated to remove the taint of the constitutional violation,
then the evidence is admitted and the analysis stops. Logically,
this analysis should precede application of the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine since the inevitable discovery doctrine requires that
the evidence must have been first acquired through a constitu-
tional violation. The advantage of applying these three doctrines
in this order is that, in cases such as Murray, this systematic
approach ensures that each doctrine is applied using the factors
which are relevant to its application. The following flowchart
demonstrates this approach.
439. 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
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B. Application of the Independent Source Doctrine and Com-
parison with Segura v. United States
Having reviewed the appropriate tests for application of the
independent source, attenuated connection, and inevitable dis-
covery doctrines, an analysis of Murray v. United States4O must
begin with application of the "but for" test from the indepen-
dent source doctrine. This analysis must provide a detailed com-
parison between Segura v. United States44' and Murray in order
to determine whether the "but for" analytical framework pro-
vided in Segura can be applied to Murray.
There are obvious similarities between these two cases.
First, the evidence in question was drug related material.442 Sec-
ond, the original entry was determined to be unlawful as no exi-
gent circumstances were found to be present.443 Third, the
agents involved had probable cause (as later confirmed by the
magistrates who issued the warrants) to believe that drugs
would be present in both the apartment in Segura4 " and the
warehouse in Murray.4 5 Finally, the evidence at issue was later
seized during a subsequent search pursuant to a search warrant
based on the probable cause that existed prior to the illegal en-
try into the apartment or warehouse.4 6
Three significant features distinguish these two cases. In
Segura, the search warrant process had already been started
prior to entry.447 In Murray, the process was started after the
entry.4 8 In addition, since the search warrant process in Segura
had been started before the initial entry, there is no question
presented in the case regarding consideration of whether to in-
clude or exclude in the affidavit information obtained as a result
440. 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
441. 468 U.S. 796 (1984), see supra notes 238-64 and accompanying text.
442. Segura, 468 U.S. at 801. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
443. Segura, 468 U.S. at 804. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
444. Segura, 468 U.S. at 810-11.
445. United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 600 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted
and remanded sub nom. Murray v. United States, 476 U.S. 1178 (1986), aff'd on remand
sub nom. United States v. Carter, 803 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
446. Segura, 468 U.S. at 814. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2536.
447. Segura, 468 U.S. at 801.
448. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
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of the search.4"9 In Murray, however, there was clear testimony
of this consideration as well as the decision by the agents not to
include any reference to the illegal search in the warrant affida-
vit.4 50 Finally, in Segura, the evidence found in plain view dur-
ing the illegal search was not addressed by the Court.451 In Mur-
ray, this issue was addressed directly. 2
When considering these critical differences between Segura
and Murray, it would appear that Justice Scalia's reliance on
Segura is unfounded. The primary and most critical difference
between the two cases is that the search warrant process in
Segura had started prior to the actual illegal entry."' Thus,
there is no question that the decision to obtain a search warrant
was independent of the illegal entry. In addition, the warrant
application and the affidavit for the search warrant were not af-
fected by the search. The agents in Segura could maintain that
even if they had not entered the apartment and seen the drug
related material on the initial entry, they still would have re-
ceived the same search warrant. Consequently, the "but for"
analysis of Segura appears correct.
The fact that in Murray the process of requesting the
search warrant was initiated after the illegal entry and the dis-
cussion that occurred over whether to include the fact of the ille-
gal entry in the warrant affidavit,45'4 indicates a causal relation-
ship between the two events. Clearly, had the agents not found
any evidence during the illegal search, they would have submit-
ted a different search warrant affidavit or would not have re-
quested a search warrant at all. The Franks v. Delaware'55 pro-
hibition on misleading the magistrate would prevent the agents
from maintaining the probable cause belief they once had, but
no longer continued to have, due to the change in circumstances.
Here, the inclusion in the affidavit of facts that had originally
449. Segura, 468 U.S. at 800-01. Agents clearly discussed obtaining the search war-
rant prior to entry but due to "lateness of the hour, a search warrant for petitioners'
apartment could not be obtained until the following day .... " Id.
450. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 70.
451. Segura, 468 U.S. at 802 n.4.
452. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
453. Segura, 468 U.S. at 800.
454. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 70.
455. 438 U.S. 154 (1978), see supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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led them to believe there were quantities of illegal drugs present
in the warehouse"56 would have been misleading if they knew the
drugs were not present. For Agent Keaney to maintain that he
had probable cause to believe facts that he knew to be untrue
would be a false statement. Because this statement would be
necessary to a finding of probable cause, "the search warrant
must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same
extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affida-
vit." 457 Thus, the results of the illegal search had a direct bear-
ing on the decision to obtain a search warrant and determined
what information was to be included in and excluded from the
search warrant affidavit.
This assessment that the illegal search had a direct bearing
on the search warrant process is correct even if the agents had
some nonformulated plan to eventually obtain a search warrant
for the warehouse. The agents had not indicated in their testi-
mony that specific plans for obtaining a search warrant existed
prior to the entry. Furthermore, Supervising DEA Agent
Garibotto testified that his decision to enter the warehouse was
made prior to his arrival there,5 8 making it clear that the exi-
gent circumstances exception to the search warrant preference
rule would not be appropriate. 459 The essence of this analysis is
that there is a "but for" relationship between the illegal search
and the warrant-authorized search. Consequently, an application
of the independent source doctrine, as enunciated in
Silverthorne and Segura, requires that the evidence be
suppressed.
456. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 22 (affidavit of Agent Keaney attached to
search warrant). Agent Keaney asserted: "I believe, based on all the foregoing facts, that
there is probable cause to believe that controlled substances, including marijuana ...
are concealed and will be found at ... the white cinderblock building [the warehouse]...
'I /d.
457. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.
458. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 50 (pretrial transcript).
459. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). Officers where possible should obtain
a warrant or use less restrictive means such as securing the premises from the outside.
Id. at 34. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text for futher discussion on Vale.
An analysis of the factors presented in United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268-69 (3d
Cir. 1973), would also indicate exigent circumstances did not exist. See supra notes 120-
22 and accompanying text for further discussion on Rubin.
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C. Application of Attenuated Connection Doctrine through
Test Proposed in Brown v. Illinois
The more difficult assessment of whether the evidence is the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" in Murray is the attenuated con-
nection analysis using a modified test developed in Brown v. Illi-
nois.46 The Brown v. Illinois test, as proposed by Justice Black-
mun, would provide guidance over the determination of whether
evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant was sufficiently
attenuated to remove the taint from the prior illegal warrantless
entry into the warehouse.""1 This analysis would focus on the
following factors: 1) the issuance of Miranda warnings; 2) the
temporal proximity between the fourth amendment violation
and the obtaining of the evidence; 3) the presence or absence of
intervening circumstances; and 4) the flagrancy of the violation.
The first factor, the issuance of Miranda warnings, may be elim-
inated where prior to the process of requesting a warrant, the
police conduct an illegal search. In Murray, it can be assumed
that petitioners were given Miranda warnings at the time they
were arrested. Since no incriminating statements were made
that led to the decision to enter the warehouse, this factor is
irrelevant to the assessment of whether the causal connection
was attenuated.
The second factor, temporal proximity between the fourth
amendment violation and the acquisition of evidence, suggests a
close connection between these two events. In Murray, the pro-
cess of requesting a search warrant began immediately after the
illegal entry.4" 2 Therefore, an analysis of the second factor would
suggest that the greater the time delay between these two
events, the more attenuated the connection. An illegal search of
a building should not bar a legal warrant-authorized search for-
ever. At some point in time, the connection between the initial
illegal entry and the decision to re-enter under the authority of a
search warrant becomes appropriately attenuated. Conversely,
the closer in time these two events occur, the greater the causal
relationship might be. A lengthy time period between the illegal
search and the subsequent warrant-authorized search would not
460. 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975), see supra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
461. Id.
462. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 69-70.
[Vol. 10:167
70http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss1/5
MURRAY v. UNITED STATES
be sufficient, by itself, to attenuate the connection, but it would
be a consideration.
Application of the third factor, the presence or absence of
intervening factors, suggests that in Murray there were no inter-
vening circumstances. After entering the warehouse, the agents
immediately began the process of obtaining the search warrant.
While the determination of a magistrate in issuing a search war-
rant could be an intervening factor in some circumstances, it is
not an intervening factor in Murray because the agents chose
not to inform the magistrate that they had already searched the
warehouse.463 A strong argument could be made that if the
agents had informed the magistrate of the prior search, then the
magistrate's issuance of a search warrant would be an interven-
ing circumstance. Policy considerations dictate that a magistrate
who issues a search warrant does so on the basis of a complete
understanding of the situation. Disclosure of prior illegal entries
is essential if a truly neutral and detached magistrate is to issue
a search warrant. Magistrates who are presented with affidavits
which fail to mention any preceding fourth amendment viola-
tions, such as in Murray, are not performing the function envi-
sioned by the Framers; that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. ' '464
A review of the fourth factor, the flagrancy of the fourth
amendment violation, indicates that the official misconduct in
Murray was egregious. The violation was not a temporary main-
tenance of the status quo or a securing of a building from the
outside, actions which would be more limited in scope and less
invasive of the rights of individuals. In addition, exigent circum-
stances were not found to justify this warrantless entry. Indeed,
the warrantless search in Murray is exactly the type of violation
conceived of by the Framers when the fourth amendment was
adopted. The Framers were particularly incensed by the use of
the general writ to search for contraband items in places of busi-
ness. It was this practice by the Crown, among others, that in-
flamed the colonists to revolt. Thus, the flagrancy of this viola-
463. Id.
464. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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tion would strongly support exclusion of evidence at trial.
In sum, this analysis indicates that the evidence in Murray
should not be admitted based on the attenuated connection doc-
trine. The three relevant factors supporting attenuation are not
present. There was a close temporal relationship, there was no
intervening circumstance, and the violation was particularly
flagrant.
D. Application of Inevitable Discovery
The basic principle of inevitable discovery as enunciated in
Nix v. Williams"65 is that this doctrine allows admission of evi-
dence even though it has been discovered through a constitu-
tional violation, provided that the evidence would have been dis-
covered by lawful means. The Court in Nix detailed the
historical facts which were documented at trial and provided the
basis for the assertion that the police would have inevitably dis-
covered the body within a short period of time.1' The Court
concluded that:
On this record it is clear that the search parties were approaching
the actual location of the body, and we are satisfied, along with
three courts earlier, that the volunteer search teams would have
resumed the search had Williams not earlier led the police to the
body and the body inevitably would have been found.467
Justice Marshall appears to be on solid ground in his analysis
that the holding of Nix indicates that inevitable discovery re-
quires historical facts to demonstrate that the discovery was, in
fact, inevitable.6 8
Other than in Murray and Segura v. United States, the Su-
preme Court has not provided clear guidelines regarding the cor-
rect doctrine to be applied and the factors to be considered
where police conduct warrantless illegal searches followed by
warrant-authorized searches and where the search warrant pro-
465. 467 U.S. 431 (1984); see supra notes 216-37 and accompanying text.
466. 467 U.S. at 448-49. The Court commented on the extensive testimony that de-
tailed the process of the search and the systematic approach that was followed. The
Court noted that the testimony at the trial court indicated that the body would have
been discovered in approximately three to five hours. Id. at 449.
467. Id. at 449-50.
468. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2539 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cess was not initiated until after the illegal search. Assuming,
arguendo, that one rejects Justice Scalia's position that the
knowledge was obtained both legally and illegally," 9 then it
would be necessary to demonstrate whether the inevitable dis-
covery exception would apply. This would require that: one, an
independent legal means of discovery could have discovered the
evidence if it had not first been discovered through a fourth
amendment violation; two, the police through this independent
legal means would have inevitably made this discovery; and
three, the information necessary to make the discovery inevita-
ble was possessed by the police.
A major unresolved issue is whether the police must be in
actual pursuit of the alternate line of investigation prior to the
misconduct.470 Since the holding in Murray is based on the inde-
pendent source doctrine and not on inevitable discovery, this is-
sue is still unresolved. The argument in United States v.
Cherry471 is that failure to require active pursuit of alternate
lines of investigation would encourage police misconduct.4 72 The
problem with not meeting this requirement is that there is a
question of what indicia is to be used to assert that there was
inevitability of discovery. If, as in Murray, the application for
the search warrant had not been initiated until after the agents'
misconduct, then the assertion that the evidence would have
been discovered would be based entirely on the agents' own tes-
timony as to their intentions. There would be little to challenge
the agents' testimony on their subjective intentions other than
inferences based on the length of the investigation and the infor-
mation known prior to the misconduct.
In Murray there are no facts in the record which provide
the basis for concluding that the evidence would have been dis-
covered by lawful means. All testimony indicates that the issue
of the search warrant was not discussed prior to the entry.473
Silvestri instructs that the inevitable discovery doctrine can
only be applied when there is a showing that the decision to seek
469. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2535.
470. See United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 742-44 (1st Cir. 1986) for review of
circuits which disclosed clear division on this issue.
471. 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1985).
472. Id. at 1205.
473. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 68 (pretrial transcript).
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a search warrant was made prior to the fourth amendment viola-
tion.474 The Silvestri court summarized the three basic concerns
raised when applying the inevitable discovery analysis: "are the
legal means truly independent; are both the use of the legal
means and the discovery by that means truly inevitable; and
does application of the inevitable exception either provide an in-
centive for police misconduct or significantly weaken fourth
amendment protection? '4 75 Consequently, in Murray the direct
testimony that no discussions occurred concerning the acquisi-
tion of a search warrant prior to the entry mandates that the
evidence must be suppressed. The inevitable discovery exception
would not apply.
E. Cost-Benefit Analysis Myth
The underlying basis for Scalia's holding in Murray is the
strong sentiment toward the rejection or at least the confine-
ment of the exclusionary rule. The Court, through a progression
of cases, has effectively emasculated the exclusionary rule and
the warrant clause of the fourth amendment. United States v.
Calandra476 established a cost-benefit balancing analysis ap-
proach to fourth amendment jurisprudence. United States v.
Leon 77 established that the good faith of the officers would be
sufficient to allow admissibility of otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence. Nix v. Williams 75 established the inevitable discovery
doctrine, allowing evidence to be admitted even though directly
obtained through a constitutional violation. Segura v. United
States479 allowed the admissibility of evidence through the inde-
pendent source doctrine where police had started the process of
requesting a warrant prior to the illegal search and seizure. The
policy underlying this trend is the belief that the exclusionary
rule's cost to society is too excessive. The legacy of this strong
474. Silvestri, 787 F.2d at 746. The court found that "[tihere can be little doubt
that at the time the securing of the property was ordered, a decision to seek a search
warrant had been made which was in no way influenced or accelerated by Sergeant Du-
Bois' discovery of drugs." Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
475. Id. at 744.
476. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
477. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
478. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
479. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
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sentiment can be seen in Justice White's remarks in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire4 80 and Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.4 81 The
overall effect of these rulings is to reduce the fourth amendment
to "a form of words"" 2 and to deprive meaning from the re-
quirement of the warrant clause. This effectively returns the
fourth amendment jurisprudence to the principles espoused in
Harris v. United States483 and United-States v. Rabinowitz.484
These cases gave priority to the reasonableness of the conduct of
the officers in a search or seizure over the requirement of ob-
taining a warrant. Although Justice Powell indicated that "[tihe
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead lan-
guage,"4 85 the effect of Leon, Nix, Segura, and Murray is that
the warrant clause is "dead language."
In terms of an overall assessment of the criminal justice sys-
tem in America and the cost of the exclusionary rule, the report
by the American Bar Association's Section of Criminal Justice
seriously questions the Court's findings of the high cost of the
exclusionary rule.486 The committee formed by the Section of
Criminal Justice to prepare the report found that
"[c]onstitutional restrictions .. .do not significantly handicap
police and prosecutors in their efforts to arrest, prosecute and
obtain convictions of criminal defendants for most serious
crimes. '487 The committee was more concerned over the fact
that of the estimated thirty-four million serious crimes commit-
ted in the United States in 1986, only approximately three mil-
lion resulted in arrest, and of these three million only several
hundred thousand led to successful felony convictions punished
by imprisonment.48 This failure was found not to be due to con-
stitutional restrictions, but according to the professionals inter-
480. 403 U.S. 443, 516-17 (1971) (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
481. 403 U.S. 388, 415-16 (1971).
482. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
483. 331 U.S. 145 (1947); see supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
484. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
485. United States v. United States Dist. Court E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 315
(1972).
486. Criminal Justice in Crisis, supra note 179.
487. Id. at 2.
488. Id. at 3.
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viewed, was a result of the lack of fiscal resources. "89 Thus, the
concern expressed by these professionals, as noted in the com-
mittee report, was that a criminal justice system is not so much
affected by the constitutional restraints as it is affected by the
lack of necessary financial resources. Funding is needed to seek
out and arrest the guilty, to bring them to trial, and to provide a
correctional system which can handle the volume of prisoners. 90
It is this lack of financial resources which is affecting the judicial
process." " The committee also found throughout the question-
ing of criminal justice professionals that the exclusionary rule
has in fact promoted professionalism in police departments
across the country.'92 Consequently, this would indicate that the
holding of Mapp v. Ohio93 has dramatically improved the ad-
herence to constitutional standards and has resulted in appro-
priate training.
Thus, it would appear that the Supreme Court, in its deci-
sion in Murray, is continuing to reflect the myth of the excessive
cost of the exclusionary rule and has been utilizing this myth as
the underpinning to various decisions which cut away at the
rule. This perception of the "costs" of the exclusionary rule is
the basis for the cost-benefit analysis approach begun in Calan-
dra. The empirical studies do not support the application of the
cost-benefit analysis; in fact, these studies provide significant
support for Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion. 9' In addition,
the very concept of a cost-benefit analysis is not consistent with
the intent of the fourth amendment.'9 5
489. Id. at 4.
490. Id.
491. Recent lack of space in the New York City correctional system has resulted in
repeated instructions to the police not to arrest individuals committing crimes which are
minor. Here, it is not the constable that has blundered, but the taxpayers, resulting in
the guilty going free.
492. Criminal Justice in Crisis, supra note 179, at 15.
493. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
494. See Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About
the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost"
Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 678-80.
495. See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Princi-
pled Basis" rather than an "Empirical Proposition"'?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983).
"The very purpose of the Bill of Rights," added Justice Jackson, in an oft-quoted
passage, "was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political con-
troversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to estab-
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V. Conclusion
The appropriate analysis for the situation presented in
Murray v. United States""' in which police first conduct an ille-
gal search and then obtain a search warrant, is through the at-
tenuated connection analysis, utilizing the modified test articu-
lated in Brown v. Illinois.97 The independent source doctrine
and the inevitable discovery doctrine are inappropriate where
the police have searched first without having begun the process
of obtaining a search warrant. This conclusion is based on the
different purposes that the independent source, attenuated con-
nection, and inevitable discovery doctrines serve in fourth
amendment violations. The Supreme Court, in not reversing and
ordering the suppression of evidence discovered through a clear
fourth amendment violation, may provide an incentive to law
enforcement officers to disregard the constitutional imperatives.
This holding and other recent holdings498 are based on an incor-
rect analysis regarding the cost of the exclusionary rule. More-
over, this holding ignores the fact that the cost-benefit analysis
approach is inappropriate for fourth amendment questions. The
Framers understood and accepted the cost of the amendment.
In addition, it has been a requirement of the Court that ex-
ceptions to the exclusionary rule be limited in number and
lish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." The purpose of the Bill
of Rights, I would add, was to place certain subjects beyond the reach of cost-
benefit analysis (except for the most extraordinary circumstances).
Id. at 653 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)); see also Stew-
art, supra note 142, at 1393.
Similarly, the rule has been critized for hindering the police in the performance of
their duties. Once again, this criticism is properly reserved for the fourth amend-
ment. The exclusionary rule places no limitation on the actions of the police. The
fourth amendment does. The inevitable result of the Constitution's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures and its requirement that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause is that police officers who obey its strictures
will catch fewer criminals. That is not a political outcome impressed upon an un-
willing citizenry by unbeknighted judges. It is the price the framers anticipated
and were willing to pay to ensure the sanctity of the person, the home, and prop-
erty against unrestrained governmental power. The elimination of the exclusion-
ary rule would not lift these constitutional restraints on the conduct of the police.
Kamisar, supra at 653.
496. 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
497. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
498. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
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scope. This would suggest that Justice Marshall was correct in
asserting that the inevitable discovery doctrine be based on facts
that can be verified. e9 Justice Scalia's position that "such a pro-
phylactic exception to the independent source rule is [not] nec-
essary"500 begs the question and is not consistent with the his-
tory of exceptions to the search warrant requirement and to the
exclusionary rule. Since the analysis has indicated that the inde-
pendent source doctrine, attentuated connection doctrine, and
the inevitable discovery doctrine are not appropriate for the sit-
uation presented in Murray, the evidence in question should not
be admitted; it is the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The suppression of evidence found during an initial war-
rantless search in plain view is necessary because it provides the
only disincentive to illegal prewarrant entries. This, in turn, fur-
thers the constitutional requirement that probable cause be de-
termined by a neutral and detached magistrate, not by the offi-
cials engaged in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime. 01 The seizure of the evidence in Murray pursuant to a
search warrant is not attenuated in the sense in which the term
is used in Nardone v. United States,50 2 Wong Sun v. United
States,5"3 and Brown v. Illinois.504 A traditional evaluation of at-
tenuated connection looks to historical facts to determine if the
connection is truly independent.5 05 The majority opinion in
Murray allows the intent of the officers to determine if means
are independent. Thus, the Court has provided an incentive for
police violations of the Constitution and has effectively emascu-
lated the warrant clause of the fourth amendment.
John P. Ekberg
499. Murray, 108 S. Ct. at 2539 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
500. Id. at 2534 n.2.
501. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914-15 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 240 (1983); Lo-ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
502. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
503. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
504. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
505. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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